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This thesis examines the development of Wahhabism as an 
ideology into a rapidly expanding, transportable, 
contemporary Islamic political system. Serving as the 
territorial foundation, individuals maintain allegiance to 
Makkah, the center of the Islamic world, through symbolic 
Islamic prayer. Along with a central, globally financed 
economic distributive mechanism, and Wahhabi social and 
educational institutions emerging from the traditional 
mosque, Wahhabism serves the demand for an Islamic 
political system in a late capitalist world.  
Wahhabism is fluid within contemporary dynamic 
political systems and rapidly changing international 
relations.  Wahhabism continues to expand at a global 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
This study will examine the development of Wahhabism 
from an ideology to a political system.  Wahhabism is a 
term derived from a man named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
ibn Suleiman ibn Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Rashid al 
Tamimi, born in 1703 AD, north of Riyadh in the small town 
of Uyayna, in the Arabian Peninsula (Wahhabism Exposed 
Sheikh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 2004). The term 
Wahhabism is generally used to indicate radical Islamic 
movements or Islamic fundamentalism (Dallal, 1993).  
However, this study aims to demonstrate that although 
Wahhabism is a potent religious ideology, it is also a 
political system based on the ideology, and founded by 
Saudi Arabia’s ruling family, the al-Sa’ud, and their 
political strategist, Abd al-Wahhab. 
It is critical to demonstrate the difference between 
Wahhabism as an ideology and as a political system. 
Ideologies play a part in the development and operation of 
political systems and the ideological infrastructure 
influences a political system’s institutions and techniques 
(Loewenstein, 1953). Within the dynamics of sociopolitical 
 3
power, Wahhabi ideology is the motive force and the 
subsequent political system’s techniques and institutions 
are the mechanics or apparatus by which Wahhabism as an 
ideology transforms and reproduces itself into real 
political and social action. Wahhabi ideology provides the 
substructure for the institutionalized existence of 
Wahhabism as a political system. In much the same way, 
Wahhabism as an ideology creates and uses institutions and 
techniques commensurate to its ideological premises, in 
order to realize sociopolitical action. For the purpose of 
this study, Loewenstein’s major premise applies, in that 
Wahhabism’s underlying political ideology conditions the 
function and shapes the operation of the Wahhabi political 
system comprised of political institutions and techniques 
(Loewenstein). 
Wahhabi ideology was an effective tool utilized to 
unite and control the masses in Saudi Arabia (Blanchard, 
2005). Wahhabi ideology is elevated into the realm of 
mystical by denial of study and thorough comprehension of 
its foundations, empowering itself through lack of 
scholarly research, even of its perpetrators and 
perpetuators. Western and non-Islamic misrepresentation of 
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Wahhabism, through lack of knowledge of its foundation and 
structure, breeds prejudice from those who do not 
understand and contempt (demonstrated in the form of 
contemporary terrorism) from its followers worldwide. 
Wahhabi political systems represent a comprehensive 
set of institutions-economic, government, and educational, 
and the relations between those institutions, accompanied 
by the rules and norms that govern their function.  Wahhabi 
ideology evolved into a political system with key 
components based on Islamic and tribal economic, 
authoritative, and social practices and beliefs, providing 
the ruling authority, the al-Sa’ud, with a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force and legislation.  The study of 
Wahhabism as a political system demonstrates the historical 
significance of tribal groups in exercising political 
authority, alongside Islamic jurists and clergy. 
Recent terrorist attacks against the United States, 
its interests overseas and those of its allies, including 
the bombing of the twin towers in New York, bombings in 
Europe, the explosions at the expatriate compound in 
Riyadh, and the beheading of foreign nationals and American 
citizens Johnson and Berg, necessitate a better 
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understanding of Wahhabism as both an ideology and a 
political system. Although many scholars are quick to 
employ the term Wahhabi in examining contemporary religious 
terrorism, there is a need for scholarly work that 
addresses the foundations and the real meaning behind the 
discourse. 
This study aims to demonstrate that Wahhabism is an 
ideology that has developed into a political system.  
Before examining the life of the founder of Wahhabism, it 
is important to point out the historical precedence of 
Islamic territoriality in the Arab world. 
Saudi Arabia is host to the two most sacred Islamic 
shrines in the world – the Kaaba (a house constructed in 
primitive days to worship one God) at Makkah and the mosque 
and tomb of the ‘seal of the prophets,’ Mohammed ibn Abd 
Allah (born 570 A.D.), at Medinah (Rupert, 2005). One of 
the mandatory five pillars of Islam (the five most 
fundamental aspects of Sunni Islam) is the pilgrimage or 
hajj to Makkah, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia serves as the 
leading Sunni Moslem Islamic authority; its populations 
represent models of Islamic conduct and practices for 
Moslems around the world. Therefore, being the birthplace 
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of the founder of Islam as well as host to the two most 
sacred Islamic sites, Saudi Arabia is considered the 
spiritual leader of the Islamic world (Metz, 1993).   
 In the absence of a clear method of succession in the 
desert Kingdom, the al-Sa’ud have utilized the Wahhabi 
political system over the decades in order to maintain 
power over the increasingly vital, oil laden region of the 
world. Today, Wahhabi activists struggle to control Saudi 
Arabia, while the al-Sa’ud family, the proclaimed guardians 
of the Islamic world, maintain power over one of the 
largest petroleum reserves in the world, while also 
controlling the majority of the buying power in the Middle 
East. 
This study will demonstrate that Wahhabism emerged in 
the Arabian Desert as an ideology and subsequently, was 
developed into a political system by the al-Sa’ud with the 
guidance and assistance of a political strategist named Abd 
al-Wahhab. Al-Wahhab’s ideas, along with al-Sa’ud political 
ambitions, served to consolidate and strengthen political 
power and control over the vast, fragmented Arabian 
Peninsula and its tribes. That Wahhabi system, modified and 
adjusted throughout the decades by a tightening and 
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loosening of religious, economic, and political controls, 
allowed the al-Sa’ud tribal family to attain political 
power over all of the tribes of Arabia, consolidating them 
into what is known as present day Saudi Arabia.  
For the past decade, Wahhabism has been predominantly 
classified in the news and academia as a form of radical 
Islam. Authors including Fuad Ajami, along with a multitude 
of rhetoricians, expound on Wahhabism in contemporary 
literature with little or no exposure to the Wahhabi-based 
system. Daniel Pipes, a published Middle East and Islamic 
analyst, calls Wahhabism a death cult in conflict with the 
rest of Islam, although Wahhabism does not advocate death, 
and most mainstream Moslems are not familiar with Wahhabism 
as a particular cult of Islam (Pipes, 2004) (Kaplan, 2004). 
The dearth of scholarly research on Wahhabism creates a 
vacuum whereby analysts form unsubstantiated conclusions, 
often leading to greater conflict through the 
misrepresentation of Islam to the world. 
In this study I will deconstruct Wahhabism and examine 
its foundations and the historical contexts within which it 
evolved, together with the meaning of the term Wahhabism; 
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utilized to imply a variety of predominantly religious 
connotations within differing contexts. 
The fluidity of its definition has led to a 
misunderstanding of the Wahhabi phenomenon. While the term 
Wahhabism can be used to symbolize a radical Islamic 
movement, it is in that particular context that we may lose 
the real significance of Wahhabism as a rapidly expanding 
political movement, rendering those threatened by it less 
capable of dealing with the potentially dangerous 
ramifications. 
Labeling Wahhabism a religion or a component of the 
Islamic religion has also increased the movement’s ability 
to recruit members into its dangerous and seemingly 
contagious war that aligns East against West and Islam 
against the infidels that are exemplified by Americans and 
American culture (Ambah, 2004). Disenfranchised and 
marginalized populations are attracted to Wahhabism as an 
answer to global problems. 
Wahhabism can expand very rapidly under these 
conditions, resulting in the propagation of a more hostile 
religion-based ideological political system. Therefore, not 
only is the meaning of Wahhabism fluid within contemporary 
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dynamic political systems and rapidly changing 
international relations, but, as a political system, it 
continues to expand at a global level, giving rise to a new 
form of contemporary terrorism. 
Wahhabism has spread to Eastern Europe, Central Asia, 
throughout the entire Middle East, as well as to large 
parts of Africa and the United States. Governments from all 
over the world are scrambling in attempts to prevent 
further establishment of the so-called Wahhabi dens or 
cells. Azeri newspaper Zerkalo in April 2005 noted that 
Wahhabism is deeply rooted in Azerbaijan (Azeri Paper 
Blames Spread of Wahhabism on Russia, 2005). The majority 
of the Wahhabi adherents in Azerbaijan perform their 
rituals in specific alternative mosques. Bosnian national 
security specialist Radoslav Gacinovic observed that up to 
tens of thousands of Wahhabis were granted citizenship in 
Bosni-Hercegovina from 1989-2002 (Bokan, 2005). Countries 
around the world are attempting to formulate laws and 
programs to counter Wahhabi ideas (Chechen Leader, 2005) 
Comprehension of the evolution of Wahhabism is crucial 
to understanding that contemporary Wahhabism is not an 
Islamic fundamentalist ideology but a comprehensive Islamic 
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based political system. In order to grasp the concept of 
Wahhabism, one must have an insight into the Islamic 
religion and the context with which its practices were 
established in the Arabian Desert; in point, the political, 
economic, and social contexts within which the Wahhabi 
movement emerged along with the schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
Chapter two will examine the concepts of ideology and 
political system from a theoretical point.  Next, it will 
focus on the birth of Wahhabism, a little explored, yet 
vital, component of the complex system it represents today. 
The al-Sa’ud has turned the birth of Wahhabism into a 
religious myth, promulgating its legitimacy. This and the 
absence of research have resulted in a lack of clarity in 
terms of the initial relationship between the al-Sa’ud and 
Abd al-Wahhab. An understanding of the birth of Wahhabism 
can only come from the decodification of historical texts, 
a number of which will be presented and discussed in this 
study. 
Chapter three examines the different Islamic schools 
and political governance in relationship to Wahhabism. 
Fundamental knowledge of Islamic governance is very 
 11
important in an understanding of the evolution of the 
Wahhabi political movement. Since its inception, Saudi 
Arabia has endured multiple political systems ranging from 
tribal chieftains, to the sanctified Islamic prophet 
Mohammed, to the Caliphates, to the Bedouin al-Sa’ud, 
today’s contemporary tribal leaders. 
Critical components of Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
teachings were derived from the Hanbali Islamic school of 
jurisprudence and the teachings of the Islamic scholar Ibn 
Taimiyah. Chapter three will address these knowledge 
systems cumulating in Wahhabi ideology, Abd al-Wahhab’s 
belief system, which was employed to compose the aggressive 
ideology that fueled the rapid spread of Wahhabism to the 
tribes as a “way of life” or an “Islamic” political system.  
Chapter four explores the historical elements that were 
instrumental in the evolution of Wahhabism into today’s 
political system, by examining the tribal and Islamic 
contexts at the time of the emergence of Abd al-Wahhab as 
political advisor to the al-Sa’ud. The “Islamic contract” 
was one of strategy and calculation. It was unique at this 
time since the tribes of Arabia had previously experienced 
Islam, yet had abandoned its tenets only to have them 
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revitalized again through the al-Sa’ud Wahhabi Islamic 
contract. This chapter includes the distributive economic 
mechanisms present in the formative stages of Wahhabism and 
the importance of the integration of Mohammed Abd al-
Wahhab’s economic system into the al-Sa’ud political 
unification strategy. 
 This chapter also presents an analysis that highlights 
the al-Sa’ud utilization of the Wahhabi system in order to 
consolidate and maintain power over the tribes of the 
Arabian Desert. This junction is where the Wahhabi 
political system came into existence. Wahhabi ideology had 
gained the crucial element necessary for its propagation 
through the al-Sa’ud: a legitimate authority with a goal, 
to unite the tribes of Arabia and position themselves as 
the ruling tribe of tribes. 
Chapter five of this study will take a closer look at 
Wahhabism as a political ideology and system since its 
foundation in the Arabian Desert. A comparison will be made 
between other Islamic movements including Jama’ai al-Islam, 
the Society of the Egyptian Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, and 
Wahhabism. Relative highlights of the Wahhabi system will 
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be addressed and illustrated. Finally, I will address 
Wahhabi prophesizing, expansion and their implications.  
This study represents a contextual analysis of select, 
predominantly primary source texts on Islam, Arabia, Saudi 
Arabia, and Wahhabism. A brief examination will be made of 
early Islamic texts such as the Quran and the hadith--the 
Islamic prophet Mohammed’s traditions which expand on an 
early Islamic socio-political system--as well as texts and 
oral traditions that influenced the Islamic scholars 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taimiyah, and Hanbali. The 
study will enable the reader to understand key Islamic 
texts, considered fundamental to Wahhabism and critical to 
its adherents. Many of Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings were not a 
distorted radical version of Islam but basic components of 
normal everyday Islamic practices. However, the context and 
emphasis of particular texts and practices over others has 
been extremely influential in the evolution of Wahhabism as 
a versatile and extremely powerful contemporary political 
system. 
The lack of scholarly work on Wahhabism is mainly due 
to the environment in which it emerged. Wahhabism emerged 
in Saudi Arabia, a country in which contemporary, 
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scholarly, political research is generally prohibited, 
either by denying visas to foreign academicians or by 
denying passports and education to academicians who dare 
delve in politically sensitive issues inside the country 
(Saudi Arabia: A Secret State of Suffering, 2000). Those 
who remain inside the Wahhabi system or the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia are not free to discuss or contemplate its 
foundations or socio-political mechanisms of the current 
regime. The punishment for those who reside within a 
Wahhabi system and criticize Wahhabism is death by 
execution (Three Saudis executed by beheading, 2005). 
Neither do such systems allow foreign individuals or those 
who are critical of Wahhabism to visit or maintain contacts 
with other members of or residents in Wahhabi systems, in 
order to obtain the statistical and analytical data 
necessary to conduct qualitative research and analysis.  
By illustrating the historical foundations, development 
and implementation of Wahhabism as a political system and 
comparing it with other Islamic movements, this study’s 
objective is to enlighten readers and provide them with a 
better understanding of the underlying mechanisms that are 
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contributing to the emergence of contemporary Islamic 
terrorism. 
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CHAPTER TWO: IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF WAHHABISM 
 
 
In order to examine the development of Wahhabism from 
an ideology to a political system, we must first consider 
ideology and political systems from a theoretical position. 
Ideology is a ubiquitous concept that has been defined and 
redefined throughout history. Francis Bacon founded the 
term ideology in his investigation of idols otherwise known 
as prejudices and preconceptions which “impede the exercise 
of scientific method” (Mullins, 1972, p. 499).  
Subsequently, the ideologues, French post-enlightenment 
theorists, envisioned ideology as a science of ideas, 
allowing for further empirical examination. This study 
addresses ideology from the perspective in which it 
comprises a science of ideas.  
However, the science of ideas must also be defined as 
to its basic theoretical issues in order for it to be made 
operational for empirical research. Ideology is politically 
significant in that it constitutes the power to communicate 
cognitions, ideals, evaluations, purposes, and logical 
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coherence among members of groups (Mullins, 1972). Mullins 
reminds us that the significance of ideology in the 
mobilization of group members is not so much that it is the 
cause of one’s actions but that it provides a cause for 
one’s actions.  Ideology, according to Mullins, is a 
“logically coherent system of symbols” within a historical 
conception, which “links the cognitive and evaluative 
perception of one’s social condition” in particular, its 
future prospects, “to a program of collective action for 
the maintenance, alteration, and transformation of society” 
(Mullins). 
Wahhabi ideology enables members to assess their 
political position, thereby facilitating the mobilization 
and direction of resources and energies for common 
political undertakings. The significance of ideology for 
Wahhabism rests in the ability to communicate the 
historical values and beliefs of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taimiyah and their 
subsequent interpretations of Islam to the group.  
Despite the proliferation of news reports and articles 
about Wahhabism in its many different contexts, scholarly 
pieces that address the birth of Wahhabism as a political 
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system are scarce. One reason for the lack of record is 
that the creation of Wahhabism took place in Arabia among 
nomadic tribes, not sedentary peoples. Therefore, much of 
what we see written on the topic is derived from the 
writings of renowned adventurers such as Harry St. John 
Bridger Philby, also known as Jack Philby, T.E. Lawrence, 
also known as Lawrence of Arabia, or Gertrude Bell.  
Western adventurers’ analyses are recognized as 
invaluable research, yet lack local perspective on 
institutions and the relationship between Wahhabism as an 
ideology and Wahhabism as a political system. The remainder 
of writings occur in the form of religious texts as Islamic 
jurisprudence and guidance, rather than as historical 
narrative. It is necessary to decodify and deconstruct the 
texts, jurisprudence, and guidance in order to examine 
Wahhabism as an ideology which is the basis of the Wahhabi 
political system and its techniques and institutions. 
Society is, according to Leowenstein (1953), a system 
of power relations. Political power represents the exercise 
of social control by those who maintain power. The Islamic 
community or Ummah as it existed in Arabia at the time of 
Wahhab was the political system.  However, this system had 
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collapsed and its institutions had failed to maintain an 
exercise of social control. After Abd al-Wahhab introduced 
Wahhabi ideology, in connection with the al-Sa’ud, 
Wahhabism as a political system emerged, along with the 
agencies and instruments used to attain, exercise, and 
maintain political power, although in the case of 
Wahhabism, political power was camouflaged as Islamic 
power. In essence, Wahhabism as an ideology was the motive 
force, and its institutions and techniques are the tools by 
which the ideology transforms itself into social and 
political action.  
The foundation of Wahhabism as a political system is 
comprised of a religio-state power institution, Islamic 
(Wahhabi) legal system, Islamic (Wahhabi) educational 
system, and mechanisms and institutions that protect the 
Wahhabi political system from attack. Unique, however, to 
this Wahhabi political system is a form of virtual 
government. The Wahhabi political system, unlike that of 
the traditional state, does not require actual physical 
territory. It can effectively control its members on a 
global basis, without necessitating their residence within 
the Wahhabi territory (Saudi Arabia), or more specifically, 
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the holy shrine cities of Makkah and Medinah. It is this 
form of virtual political system that is so different from 
traditional forms, which makes it ever more difficult to 
examine, comprehend, define, and predict.  
Wahhabism as an ideology was significant in the 
formation and operation of the Wahhabi political system. 
Wahhabi ideology heavily influenced the political systems’ 
institutions and techniques including constitutions, 
administrative procedure, courts, and elections in the 
Wahhabi political system. Another reason for the absence of 
scholarly analysis on Wahhabism as a political system is 
that it emerged in what is now the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
where such studies are prohibited (Bowers, 2004). In fact, 
to declare Wahhabism the existing political system in Saudi 
Arabia would be deemed treason, the penalty of which is 
death by execution by sword (Warraq, 2004).  
Wahhabism as a political system is intrinsically linked 
to the control and power of the al-Sa’ud, Saudi Arabia’s 
royal and ruling family. According to the al-Sa’ud, to 
question the birth of Wahhabism is to question the 
foundations of Islam, which originated from what is today’s 
Saudi state. Wahhabism was initiated at the birth of 
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Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, from whose name the term 
Wahhabism was coined and brought into being through a 
culmination of his training, teachings, and subsequent call 
for social reform among the Arabian tribes. 
Born in Uyayna village in Nejd, Arabia, in 1703 AD, of 
the Bani Tamim tribe, little is recorded about the first 
thirty to forty years of Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s life 
(Ahmad, 1993).  His ancestors can be traced back 16 
generations to the time of the Unitarian (believer in one 
God) ibn Taimiyah, the main source of Abd al-Wahhab’s 
religious inspiration. Both Abd al-Wahhab’s father and 
grandfather studied the works of Taimiyah who died in 1337 
AD (Ibn Taimiyah Biography, n.d.). The teachings of 
Taimiyah, an Islamic revivalist, whose ideas were still 
very much alive during Abd al-Wahhab’s time in Arabia, and 
his influence, will be presented in Chapter three. 
Abd al-Wahhab’s grandfather, Sheikh Suleiman ibn Ali 
ibn Mohammed ibn Ahmad ibn Rashid ibn Barid ibn Mushrif ibn 
Alawi ibn Wuhib, was a renowned ecclesiastic and judge in 
the town of Ayaina in 1668 AD (St. John Philby, 1955).  
Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab spent many days at his father’s side 
learning Islamic jurisprudence. His father was well versed 
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in the Islamic traditions that were passed down through the 
years by the companions of the Islamic Prophet Mohammed. 
The traditions outline the Islamic way of life ordaining 
how men and women, boys and girls, merchants, students, 
mothers, fathers, sisters, and brothers should live, even 
prescribing the method of brushing one’s teeth (Elgood, 
1962). His grandfather, father, and the Islamic scholars of 
his time not only taught these principles but the 
principles became Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab’s way of life. He 
lived according to Islam in the Arabian Desert during a 
time when the populations had relaxed their practice of the 
often demanding Islamic religious traditions (Gibbons, 
1776-1778). 
Western and foreign influences in Arabia contributed to 
the evolution of Wahhabism as an ideology and political 
system. Makkah was a central focal point for many pilgrims 
and a trade route where foreigners gathered to take 
advantage of the lucrative business opportunities that 
existed along the caravan routes (Mortel, 1995).  
Makkah had a long history of sanctified importance as 
the site of the Kaaba, a house with unique, acclaimed 
spiritual powers (Gibbon, 1776-1778). The call for 
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spiritual blessings upon visiting the house in the Arabian 
Desert spread throughout the region. This attracted people 
from far reaching places to take advantage spiritually or 
materialistically of the famous site (Ibrahim, 1982). 
Edward Gibbon, another Western adventurer, described the 
Kaaba and its existence before the Christian era in his 
writings:  
…Each tribe, each family, each independent warrior, 
created and changed the rites and the object of this 
fantastic worship; but the nation, in every age, has bowed 
to the religion as well as to the language of Makkah. The 
genuine antiquity of Kaaba ascends beyond the Christian 
era: in describing the coast of the Red Sea the Greek 
historian Diodorus has remarked, between the Thamudites and 
the Sabeans, a famous temple, whose superior sanctity was 
revered by all the Arabians; the linen of silken veil, 
which is annually renewed by the Turkish emperor, was first 
offered by the Homerites, who reigned seven hundred years 
before the time of Mohammad (Gibbon, 1776-1778). 
 
During Abd al-Wahhab’s youth, the Arabian Desert was 
undergoing a period of social, economic, and political 
transition. Nomadic tribes were becoming scarcer as trade 
and populations grew. The period of the great Islamic 
scholars had passed, and there was no longer a strong 
central leadership, nor political or otherwise ideological 
discourse, binding the peoples together. This vacuum 
resulted in apathy among many, abuse among others, and the 
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potential for social resistance to the existent social 
system. 
Prior to this apathetic time, in general, there was not 
much of a class system under Islamic rule. With the 
decreased reliance on Islamic jurisprudence to govern the 
masses there emerged, according to available Islamic 
knowledge and research, a growing differentiation among the 
tribal and immigrant people (Lewis, 1970). Those of the 
lower classes tended to adhere to and promote Islamic 
principles, allowing for them to transcend tribal class 
barriers based on authority, wealth, and physical strength. 
Sheikh Abdullah bin Ibrahim al Saif, the religious scholar 
of the holy city of Madinah, bestowed the young adult 
Wahhab, now in an elevated position holding the title of 
Sheikh, with the honor of reciting traditions (Hidaayah, 
n.d.).  The traditions that they studied were most often 
those associated with a particular Islamic school of 
thought. Just as the tribal poet was granted high positions 
of honor and respect, so was the Islamic scholar, in 
particular one who memorized Islamic traditions and texts 
such as the Quran. 
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During Abd al-Wahhab’s youth, his father was said to 
have had to hold back his son’s passion for Islamic 
practices because, at that time, the environment throughout 
Arabia was not one of strict adherence to Islamic 
tradition. The society was not, as Philby noted, “ripe for 
conversion from the easy going ways of the time” (St. John 
Philby, 1955). Islamic practices were taken lightly, not 
least within the realm of sexual relations. In fact, the 
social environment was such that not adhering to the strict 
Islamic rules was not condemned but simply ignored. 
Superstitious belief in sacrifices, the worship of some 
tombs and the ability of inanimate objects, including 
charms, trees and rocks, in order to speed up the 
gratification of human desires was the norm. In his youth, 
Abd al-Wahhab struggled to reject these un-Islamic 
practices. 
At home, Abd al-Wahhab’s family life was also filled 
with uncertainty in terms of economic and socio-political 
stability. His father, Abdul Wahhab, was removed from his 
seat as Qadhi or judge in 1726 AD – a position he had 
acquired following his grandfather Sheikh Suleiman’s death, 
by a man named Mohammed Kharfash (St. John Philby, 1955).  
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Although little is reported in terms of his father’s 
removal from this powerful position, in times of absolute 
tribal influence and politics, such an event would have 
been very traumatic in terms of maintaining tribal honor 
and respect. Abd al-Wahhab’s whereabouts, during the time 
of his father’s removal from one of the most prestigious 
offices of the period, are not known. However, it is 
anticipated that this event could have served as the 
catalyst that thrust Abd al-Wahhab into the reform movement 
that essentially began with his Islamic discourse. 
Nevertheless, Abd al-Wahhab quickly rose to be one of 
the few respected Islamic scholars in the Arabian Peninsula 
(Kechichian, 1986). An important note about his methodology 
and perhaps one of the most significant contributions he 
made to the formulation of the Wahhabi movement is that he 
is known to have based much of his discourse on a form of 
classification based on creed. He divided believers and 
non-believers into two separate and distinct camps; most of 
his actions appear to be predicated upon this 
classification (Brief Outline, 1930). 
To some degree, the Nejdi versus Hijazi environments 
may demonstrate this classification system (Cook, 1992). 
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The Hijaz region was on one of the major trade routes and 
it was there that many foreign people passed through, 
mingling with the local tribes. Power was concentrated in 
Medinah, Makkah and Jeddah, the major cities of the region, 
and was subject to exposure to those diverse and foreign 
cultural differences (Ibrahim, 1982). Nejd society was 
outside the realm of the strong foreign influence, 
therefore, the Nejdi religious ulema–-the body of Muslim 
scholars trained in Islam and Islamic law–-were less likely 
to accept change or deviation from Wahhabi influenced 
Islamic traditions. An incident in the early nineteenth 
century, involving the Hijaz and the Nejdi peoples, 
illustrates this form of classification when the ulema in 
Makkah criticized the Nejdi ulema for declaring non-Wahhabi 
Moslems among the infidels (Al-Ghafur, 1964). 
Abd al-Wahhab was a traveller and there exists a 
conspiracy theory related to his travels that describes his 
meeting with a British spy named Hempher, in Basra (now in 
modern day Iraq) around 1723 AD (Pasha, 1306). This spy 
reportedly befriended him and educated him in a strategy to 
consolidate the tribes under al-Sa’ud’s rule, through their 
adoption and application of Abd al-Wahhab’s system. Other 
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reports note that the people of Basra banished him from the 
city because of his extreme religious views (Dallal, 1993). 
From Basra, Abd al-Wahhab travelled to Syria where he wrote 
many books in response to the Arabia in which he lived, 
condemning practices such as worshiping the dead and other 
animistic beliefs prevailing amongst the tribal people of 
the 18th century Arabian Desert. 
Wahhab returned to the Nejdi town of Huraymila in the 
Arabian Peninsula in the late 1730s, to see that people 
were worshiping the dead Islamic Prophet Mohammed instead 
of God or Allah (Dallal, 1993). He vowed to fight such 
practices amongst the Shiite and local tribes and continued 
to write and preach against them. One could point to this 
intersection as key to the formation of the Wahhabi system 
in that the populations codified the call for social 
change. At this time, Abd al-Wahhab also began calling 
himself a reformer, putting him in a position of religious 
and political authority. 
Abd al-Wahhab’s movement was labelled ad dawa lil 
tawhid, the call to unity, with those following his 
movement also known as the family of the unity or ahl al 
tawhid (Glossary: Saudi Arabia). This call for unity or the 
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oneness of God was also a clear method of identification 
for those who became members of the Abd al-Wahhab social 
reform movement. The idea of worshipping one God was not 
new or different but Abd al-Wahhab attached political 
importance to the idea by attacking, in particular, the 
Shiite and condemning their practices and the influence 
that such practices had on the local populations. As a 
result, anyone who did not ascribe to the Wahhabi teaching 
was deemed not of the true Islamic believers in one God; 
therefore, they were cast into the opposite group, the 
polytheists, or those who were guilty of Shirk (idolatry or 
ascribing others to God) (Sirriyeh, 1989). Abd al-Wahhab’s 
followers began calling themselves Muwahhidun (Unitarians – 
of one God) and subsequently, those outside called his 
following the Wahhabis. This distinct form of 
classification is a critical key in the foundation of the 




[Insert Table 1 here] 
The classification of Wahhabis versus practitioners of 
Shirk was a founding principle of Wahhabi ideology and a 
key factor in propelling the movement to the forefront of 
social and political change. The concept of “the other” is 
not new to international relations or political science and 
it serves as an excellent tool toward accomplishing 
alienation as well as to strengthen group identity. The Abd 
al-Wahhab interpretation of Islam was that of either 
belonging to the group and ascribing to the beliefs set 
forth by him or being alienated as “the other” whether an 
individual was a fellow Muslim, Christian, or Jew; an 
interpretation that is against the teachings of Islam which 
calls for respect for all “people of the book” which 
included Christians and Jews as well as all Muslims.   
During the time of Abd al-Wahhab and within the tribal 
environment, survival was part of everyday life. In order 
to survive, a sense of collective identity must exist. In 
pre-Islamic Makkah, there are even reports of men taking 
their entire families to the desert and committing suicide 
because of financial disaster.  This ritual suicide or 
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I’tifad resulted in starvation and death to avoid burden 
being placed on the relatives or clan (al-Qurtubi & al-
Quran, 1967). If a tribal community embraced Abd al-
Wahhab’s teachings, then those who did not would not have 
been able to survive without the support of the collective 
group. Even today, individuals who dare step outside the 
group risk death, either through severe forms of alienation 
(such as abandonment in the desert) or execution.   
The political support that Wahhab sought was not 
forthcoming in Huraymila, so he traveled back to his home 
town of Uyaynah, where he managed to garner some support 
from local leaders--not least Uthman bin Hamd bin Muammar 
(Sa’ud Family, 2005). Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab was able to 
transform his discourse on Islamic practice to discourse in 
practice. He expanded the one God message to include a call 
for strict adherence to Islamic law or Shariah (Sa’ud 
Family). Therefore, those who adhered to the proclaimed 
Wahhabi beliefs and values were tested on their belief by 
their adherence to the practices put forth in Hanbali and 
Ibn Taimiyah interpretations of the Quran and hadith or 
Prophet Mohammed’s traditions. 
[Insert table 2 here] 
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Following the death of his father in 1740 AD, who had 
often argued against some of his ideas, Wahhab asked the 
tribal people to refrain from invoking dead or living 
spirits to assist them in their daily lives. Next, he asked 
them to stop associating other people or objects, whether 
they were a prophet or angel, with God or Allah. These two 
ideological premises of Wahhabism are extremely important 
in its socialization practices: the stripping away of an 
individual’s identity, first by taking away other vices 
that may or may not provide comfort in times of trouble, 
and secondly, by taking away the importance of any other 
human or object in an individual’s life which because of an 
attachment may be considered an association with someone or 
something other than God.  
Wahhab was adamantly opposed to constructing buildings 
over graves and their decoration, to performing pilgrimages 
to mosques other than the three proposed in Islam, and to 
anything that associated others with God, including 
celebration of the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday (Karawan, 
1992). With Uthman Muammar’s assistance, Wahhab managed to 
cut down trees worshiped for their spirits and destroy the 
dome, which stood over the grave of Ziad ibn al-Khattab. 
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Wahhab also had an adulterer stoned to death, a rarely 
executed punishment (Familiarity, n.d.). These acts 
symbolize Abd al-Wahhab’s intent to implement the complete 
Islamic legal system as a way of maintaining law and order 
in the tribal societies that existed during his time.  
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 [insert table 3 here] 
 
In exchange for the support of Uthman, Mohammed ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab “expressed hope” that the Nejdi people would obey 
Uthman (Familiarity, n.d.).  The alliance with Uthman was a 
unique moment in the birth of Wahhabism. Uthman received 
Wahhab with honor and respect and provided him with the 
material means to continue his revivalist journey to the 
extent of reportedly giving him a woman by the name of 
Jauhara. Wahhab is quoted to have told Uthman one day, “I 
hope that, if you rise in support of the one and only God, 
God Almighty will advance you, and grant you the Kingdom of 
Nejd and its Arabs” (St. John Philby, 1955). Therefore, the 
order of the day became condemning vice and commending 
virtue with many common folks, Philby reported, joining the 
ranks with enthusiasm (St. John Philby).  
Wahhab did this discreetly at first, attempting not to 
draw attention to himself by sending others to cut down 
trees of veneration or giving a man his shirt in exchange 
for his permission to cut down a tree. He gained a 
reputation of courage and sincerity, and he became one that 
many tribal people soon followed.   
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The Islamic duties and responsibilities that Abd al-
Wahhab promoted, with the exception of the birthday 
celebrations for Prophet Mohammed, are existent amongst all 
of the Islamic schools of thought, not solely within 
Hanbali jurisprudence (Dallal, 1993). Neither did al-
Wahhab’s calling differ from that of the Prophet of Islam, 
Mohammed. Abd al-Wahhab did not differ in his discourse 
from the original texts found in the Quran and hadith (a 
report of the sayings or actions of the Prophet Mohammad or 
his companions, together with the tradition of its chain of 
transmission). 
The town of Uyaynah was close to Al-Hufuf, one of the 
eastern Arabian Twelver Shiite hubs, and their leaders were 
troubled by the anti-Shiite tendency in the Wahhabi message 
(The Sa’ud Family and Wahhabi Islam 1500-1818, 1992). 
Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s call and reputation grew until 
it reached Suleiman bin Mohammed bin Urair, the Shiite 
governor of the affluent desert oasis Ahsa. Urair told 
Uthman Muammar that Wahhab must be killed or else he would 
cease giving him his kharaj or revenue. Uthman feared Urair 
and the potential loss of sizeable revenue and ordered 
Wahhab to be banished from Uyayna. Wahhab fled the town, 
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travelling through the desert to Diriyah, near Riyadh, a 
then impoverished town where the people lived in 
destitution (Familiarity, n.d.). Although Wahhab had 
managed to barter political support for his ideology in 
exchange for obedience to the ruler, he still lacked the 
economic institutions to turn his ideology into a 
legitimate, fully accepted, self-supporting political 
system. 
Abd al-Wahhab resided in Diriyah as a guest of Abd al 
Rahman bin Suwailim, who was paid a visit by Prince 
Mohammed bin Sa’ud’s brothers. Through the brothers, al-
Wahhab was introduced to the Prince Mohammed bin Sa’ud 
(Hidaayah, n.d.). People came in great numbers to hear 
Wahhab speak and though some accepted the call, others 
adamantly opposed it, establishing many adversaries to Abd 
al-Wahhab’s Islamic position. By now in alliance, Abd al-
Wahhab and Prince Mohammed ibn Sa’ud, who was also the 
Prince of Diriyah, had no choice but to use physical force 
and their army of followers to defend the movement and ward 
off the strong opposition. 
Mohammed ibn Sa’ud died in 1765 AD, and he was 
succeeded by his son Abd al Aziz ibn Mohammed ibn Sa’ud 
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(The Sa’ud Family and Wahhabi Islam 1500-1818, 1992). Abd 
al-Wahhab and Abd al Aziz continued the unique political 
alliance, and they captured the capital city of Riyadh in 
1773 AD (Rentz, 1972). 
 Abd al-Wahhab died in Dhul Qa’dah in 1791 AD. In order 
to further examine Abd al-Wahhab’s discourse and its 
transformation into political action, it is necessary to 
explore the foundations of Islamic government their 




Main Premise of Wahhabism as Ideology: Those Who 
Ascribe Through Belief and Practice versus Those Who Do Not 
UNITARIANS Muwahhidun POLYTHEIST Those Committing Shirk
Those who practice Hanbali form 
of Islam and Ibn Taimiyah 
Interpretation 
All others: those who practice 
any other form of Islam, any 







Foundation of Wahhabi Political System Backed by the 
Main Premise of Wahhabism as Ideology 
 
UNITARIANS Muwahhidun POLYTHEIST Those Committing Shirk
1. Those who practice Hanbali form 
of Islam and Ibn Taimiyah 
Interpretation 
 
2. Those who practice strict 
adherence to Wahhabi 
interpretation of Islamic law or 
Shariah 
1. All others: those who practice 
any other form of Islam, any other 
religion, or no religion at all. 
 
2. Those who practice any other 





The Muwahhidun Versus the Other: An Alienation of 
Peoples  
 UNITARIANS Muwahhidun POLYTHEIST Those Committing Shirk
1. Those who practice Hanbali 
form of Islam and Ibn Taimiyah 
Interpretation 
 
2. Establish political norms 
and rules-strict adherence to 
Wahhabi interpretation of 
Islamic law or Shariah 
 
3. Those who abandon earthly 
representation and 
relationships; destruction of 
statues, trees, etc. 
 
4. Legitimization of use of 
force based on Wahhabi 
interpretation of Islamic law 
 
5. Acceptance of ideological 
leader as judge capable of 
enforcing legislation by force 
 
6. Ideological movement 
establishes proxy rule 
 
7. Political support provided 
in exchange for support of and 
adherence to ideological 
premises which form basis of 
government 
 
1. All others: those who practice 
any other form of Islam, any 
other religion, or no religion at 
all. 
 
2. Those who practiced any other 
form of Islamic law or Shariah 
 
3. Those who create, build and 
worship earthly representations 
including statues, icons, stones 
(as are used in Shi’ite religious 
practices. 
 
4. No use of enforcement of 
Wahhabi interpretations. Freedom 
of Islamic practices. 
 
5. Acceptance of other leaders or 
cooperation between ideological 
leader and other leaders. 
 
6. Invalidation of proxy rule. 
 





CHAPTER THREE: ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND WAHHABISM 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, one of the 
differences between Wahhabism as an ideology and Wahhabism 
as a political system is the practice and enforcement of 
Wahhabi ideological beliefs. This chapter will examine 
those beliefs and their use in formulating government 
institutions that are thus required for a political system 
to function, including those institutions necessary to 
exert some form of social control. Wahhabi social control 
is achieved when the members of a society or community 
believe in the Wahhabi version of Islam and Islamic 
jurisprudence and consequently, accept the enforcement of 
those beliefs. 
Islam differs from other major religions in that its 
texts stipulate a form of politics whereby there exists no 
separation of state (dawla) from religion (din), nor is 
there a division of religious and political organization 
(Mortimer, 1982).  It has no church in terms of a corporate 
body with distinct, defined leadership separate from the 
 42
state (Brown, 2000). The ruler of the Islamic community or 
state is the religious and political leader.  Islam is a 
political religion; the Islamic community (ummah) is a 
political and religious conception with an ongoing 
significance within Islamic society (Cudsi & Dessouki, 
1981). 
Islamic ideology pre-dated Wahhabism; however, an 
analysis of the relationship between Islam and Wahhabism 
will demonstrate how the latter is a form of the revival of 
the Islamic political system with strong roots in class 
relationships that often exist within religious ideologies. 
Certain aspects of Islamic governance are very 
important in understanding the evolution of the Wahhabi 
political system.  The Arabian Peninsula has been host to 
several very diverse political systems ranging from tribal 
chieftains to the sanctified Islamic prophet Mohammed’s 
rule; and, following his death, to the Caliphates; finally, 
there are the Al-Sa’ud, today’s contemporary, settled, yet 
Bedouin, tribal leaders.  This chapter will examine the 
different Islamic schools and their relationship, if any, 
to Wahhabi ideology and political governance.  
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Wahhabi ideology promotes the formation, existence and 
resilience of the Islamic community or Ummah. The Islamic 
community represents the embodiment of the laws of God with 
the Islamic ruler having authority over the people to 
enforce those laws (Saudi Arabia, n.d.).  The Islamic 
community stresses the virtue of consistent and constant 
fulfillment of the laws of God (Shariah) (Brown, 2000).  
The origins of the word Shariah signify the path to the 
watering place, also symbolic of the way to reach the 
heavens, the main life goal of every Muslim. The Quran 
dictates, "O you who believe obey Allah and obey the 
Messenger and those in authority amongst you" (Quran, 
4:59). Therefore, it is the duty of all Muslims to obey the 
leader of the Islamic community: the one who, through his 
enforcement of the Shariah, assists the community in its 
path to heaven, hence, the watering place. It is only then 
that the individual can attain his or her identity in 
oneness with Allah or God. 
Wahhabi ideology emerged within the Arabian tribal 
society. Initially, mobile tribesmen with Islamic fervor 
conquered what became the Muslim world.  These tribesmen 
were also instrumental throughout the years in keeping the 
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activist tradition moving.  Islam, and subsequently 
Wahhabism, can be considered successful ideologies of 
tribal mobilization (Cudsi & Dessouki, 1981). Wahhabi 
ideology developed following a series of conquests into a 
form of religious orientation combined with political 
authority. Customarily, Islamic traditions did not allow 
for the sustenance of tribal activism, since many of the 
Bedouin traditions were not compatible with the dictates of 
a strict adherence to the Islamic religion, which was 
necessary to hold the Islamic community together.  
For example, strict tribal and/or clan loyalty was not 
conducive to the unification of multiple tribes under one 
Islamic leader or ruler. Furthermore, the tribal system of 
raiding for one’s own tribe or clan was not conducive to 
the Islamic tradition of sharing the booty with several 
clans or tribes. Therefore, tribal traditions facilitated 
the spread of Islam but also prevented the unification of 
tribes and the establishment of a central distributive 
mechanism necessary for the founding of an Islamic 
community. Furthermore, tribal traditions were heavily 
laden with animistic beliefs focusing on several potential 
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deities and subsequent practices, the majority of which did 
not fit into the belief in one God. 
Next, during the time of Muslim Caliphates, the 
demobilization of tribal armies of conquest transformed the 
social basis of Islamic politics.  This was, to some 
extent, facilitated by the growing inability of Islamic 
rulers to control those activists and their varying 
interpretations of the religious callings and traditions.  
New militaries and classes of political elites were formed. 
Populations were converted en masse, making the privilege 
of being the select class of Islamic subjects no longer 
attractive for just that. 
From its inception, the Islamic community became a 
religio-political community, by a series of conquests 
(Brown, 2000). However, in the early Islamic empire, 
conversion was not encouraged in order to maintain the 
Arabo-Muslim aristocratic status and to avoid the loss of 
tax revenues (jizya) paid by non-Muslims to Muslims for 
protection (Dhimma) and freedom from military duty. 
The development of Islamic government in Arabia was 
aided by the fact that the Muslim holy book, the Quran, was 
written in Arabia (Elgood, 1962). Islamic texts guarantee 
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the ruler of the Islamic community authority and legitimacy 
(Quran) (Translation of Sahih Bukhari, n.d.). The Quran 
ordains that all Moslems, “Obey Allah, and obey the 
messenger and those of you who are in authority” (Quran, 
4:59). This verse was recited to the Islamic Prophet 
Mohammed. Following his death in 632 A.D., the Caliphs, 
also Mohammed’s closest companions, were granted authority 
to rule over the Islamic world, from Abu Bakr (632-634), to 
Umar (634-644), to Uthman (644-656), and finally to Ali 
(656-661) (Rightly Guided, 2005).  These first Islamic 
rulers were also known as the rightly guided caliphs, all 
very pious individuals, having served as the closest 
companions of the Islamic prophet Mohammed.  After the rule 
of Ali, Islam witnessed serious divisions.  In 656, Uthman 
was assassinated, and Muhammad’s cousin Ali was sworn in as 
the leader of the Islamic empire (Hinds, 1972).  This was a 
breaking point in the early political leadership of Islam 
and two sects emerged, the Kharijites and the Shi’a.  Ali 
died in 661, and the Islamic world failed to witness the 
same vitality until the emergence of Wahhabism in the 
Arabian Desert. 
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Yet, it was not just any desert; Arabia was the very 
birthplace of Islam. Arabian territory hosts the two most 
sacred Islamic shrines in the world: the Ka’aba (house 
constructed in primitive days to worship one God) at Makkah 
and the mosque and tomb of the ‘seal of the prophets,’ 
Mohammed ibn Abd Allah (born 570 A.D.), at Medinah (David, 
1890).  One reason that Arabia remains the center of the 
Islamic world is that one of the mandatory five pillars of 
Islam is the pilgrimage to one of the sacred shrines, the 
house built to worship one God (the Ka’aba) located at 
Makkah, Saudi Arabia.  
The fact that the two holiest Islamic shrines are 
situated on Saudi territory grants the populations a form 
of holy abode and dictates the premonition that the earthly 
holiness transcends into the population’s physical being.   
Therefore, Saudi Arabia serves as the leading Islamic 
authority; its populations represent models of Islamic 
conduct and practices for Moslems around the world.  As 
birthplace of the founder of Islam as well as host to the 
two most sacred Islamic sites, Saudi Arabia is considered 
the spiritual leader of the Islamic world. (Metz, 1993). 
So, how is it that the Saudi nationals are labelled as 
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practitioners of Wahhabi Islam?  What links exist between 
Islamic government and Wahhabism? 
In the mid-18th century, the time of Sheikh Mohammed 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab, there existed a loose form of Islamic 
government, unlike the one posited originally by the five 
rightly chosen Caliphs.  The Peninsular populations were 
generally Moslem; however, the tribes, once again, were not 
unified.  Although the populations had converted to Islam 
from paganism, following the revelations to the Islamic 
Prophet Mohammed, there remained very strong animistic 
beliefs in spirits emanating from nature, statues, or the 
dead (Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab at-Tawheed).  These beliefs had 
to be curtailed in order to prevent the tribal people from 
ascribing to alternative religions or cults.   
The deviation from worship of one central, unifying 
religion into the worship of several competing religions 
may have posed a serious threat to the populations as they 
existed in the harsh peninsular climate.  At a minimum, 
Islam provided for the establishment of a sedentary life 
form with an effective distributive mechanism. The 
sedentary way of life in the Arabian Desert was non-
existent prior to Islam, and was found effectual for the 
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collection of tax revenues, as well as a for providing for 
a uniform legal code and books of uniform order and conduct 
which took precedence over the often harsh nomadic 
existence. 
In addition to the importance of tribal unification, 
the influx of foreign nationals created another class 
amongst the Arabian tribes, the foreign immigrants who, as 
traders or pilgrims, had entered the Peninsula and made it 
their home.  These foreign people brought with them foreign 
beliefs and practices that were not compatible with the 
tribal culture.   
However, Bedouin tribes used the foreign pilgrims and 
traders to earn a living; some of the largest tribes like 
the al-Harbi often survived the extreme Desert hardship by 
robbing passing caravans or by selling hard-boiled eggs to 
them on the roadside (.  Once these foreign peoples began 
to settle along the trade routes or close to the religious 
sites, the element of class was introduced into the 
traditional tribal unit. The merchant class became an 
important factor dividing the people. It was important that 
the foreign elements were not rejected altogether by the 
tribal Bedouins who had gone back to Bedouin customs 
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(Mortimer, 1982). The combination of Wahhabism and Islam, 
as a rational and civilized religion for the growing 
sedentary populations, was an answer to the fragmented, 
warring tribal Bedouin.  
The development of Wahhabi ideology is key to the 
development of the Saudi Arabian Islamic religio-political 
system, otherwise known as Wahhabism.  How did Wahhabi 
ideology develop and transform into a rudimentary political 
system consisting of its own legislation and social 
institutions?  
An analysis of Wahhabism must take into consideration 
the belief systems and practices integral to the ideology 
and political system. It is through the Wahhabi belief 
system that the ideology is formed. The subsequent practice 
of those beliefs and the enforcement of the social 
practices are a key component (as was discussed in chapter 
two) of the Wahhabi political system. Islamic texts that 
are integral to Wahhabi ideology are the Quran and hadith. 
In the mid-18th century, Islamic studies elevated the 
lower classes, often placing them in political and higher 
social positions. This elevation of alienated and 
disadvantaged members of society based on religious studies 
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remains a strong component of Wahhabism today, one which 
allows for the differentiation of a member of a Wahhabi 
political system from a non-Wahhabi member of society.  
 
[insert table 4 here] 
 
Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab memorized the entire Quran 
by the age of ten (.  His father taught him to read the 
Quran, its interpretation or tafsir, and the Prophetic 
traditions, concentrating on the books and writings, in 
particular, of Sheikh Ibn Taimiyah and Ibn al Qayyim.  Abd 
al-Wahhab was a scholar of the Hanbali School of Islamic 
thought as well as the works of Islamic scholar Ibn 
Taimiyah.   
Ibn Taimiyah al Harrani, a Hanbali scholar, was also 
known as Abu al Abbas Ahmad ibn Abd al Halim (Refutations, 
2005). He died in 728 A.H. in a Damascus prison. His 
teachings and views of Islam were often opposed by other 
scholars. He represented an Islamic revival movement; his 
teachings emphasized forbidding evil and promoting good. 
Some of his main attacks were against the worship of 
statues and pictures and oppression as well as earthly 
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pleasures and commodities (Dallal, 1993).  He fought for 
the utilization of God’s names in everyday life, the 
unification of the Moslem people, Moslem brotherhood, 
belief in the hereafter, and social equality. Many assert 
that Wahhab’s beliefs were mainly founded from the 
teachings of Ibn Taimiyah (Ibn Taimiyah, n.d.).   
 
[insert table 5 here] 
During the time of Sheikh Wahhab, all of the Islamic 
schools of jurisprudence and thought and their respective 
teachings existed throughout the Arab world.  The religious 
schools did not form the basis of political legitimisation 
in the Arabian Gulf, but rather, they were the basis of the 
existence of different socio-economic systems within the 
various tribes and regions. 
Wahhabism as a political system has its own set of 
social institutions including an educational system, which 
promulgates its particular version of religiously oriented 
ideology. In order to understand the complex Wahhabi 
version, one must examine some key aspects of Islam. 
Several sources of Islamic doctrine outline the Islamic way 
of life, which reflect parallel sets of matching social 
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institutions. Islamic scholars utilize these texts to 
formulate the foundations of the Islamic community’s 
political organization.  The foundations of the Islamic 
community, otherwise known as the “way of life,” are put 
forth in two main doctrines: the Islamic holy book, the 
Quran, and the traditions or hadith of the Islamic Prophet 
Mohammed.  The Quran, reportedly, was recited to Prophet 
Mohammed from an angel named Gabriel, beginning when he 
reached the age of forty, and continuing over a period of 
23 years (Davis, 1890).  The Islamic Prophet’s traditions, 
which included everything from the correct direction to 
face while engaging in sexual intercourse to the method of 
brushing ones teeth, were narrated and passed down by his 
closest companions (Translation of Sahih Bukhari, n.d.) 
Islam, like most other religions, hosts clergy or 
religious specialists with authority over the community. In 
Islam, the religious authorities are called the Ulema, 
memorizing a large, mainly unchanging corpus of religious 
text and knowledge, guardians and transmitters of the 
Islamic theological and legal traditions. From the Ulema 
emerge the fuqaha, those learned in the study of Islamic 
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law (fiqh), who provide information for the judges (qadhis) 
and jurisconsults of Islam (Brown, 2000).  
Muslim political theorist Ibn Taimiyah devised a 
political theory based on the Caliphate that symbolized the 
existence of an ideal unified Islamic community or ummah. 
Religious scholars interpret Islamic sources of knowledge. 
Their analysis and interpretation are then decreed the 
foundation of legal jurisprudence upon which the Islamic 
community can abide.   
Wahhabi ideology is based on a blend of the 
jurisprudence of the Hanbali Islamic school, ideas 
presented by Islamic scholar Ibn Taimiyah (including the 
abandonment of all earthly pleasures and their 
representations and the utilization of God terms in 
everyday life), and Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s own 
personal teachings. Early Islamic leadership led to the 
proliferation of Islamic schools of law with approximately 
500 of them disappearing from the 3rd to the 9th century 
(Mez, 1937). However, the remaining four main schools of 
Islamic thought resulted in the institutionalization of the 
Islamic community’s legal norms. The four main schools of 
Islamic thought are Hanbali, Shafii, Hanafi, and Maliki.  
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The Hanafi school of law was founded by the Iraqi Islamic 
scholar Abu Hanifa (699-767); the Maliki by Malik ibn Anas 
(715-795) from Medinah; the Shafii school by successors of 
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafii (767-820); and the Hanbali by 
a student of Shafii-Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855) (Esposito, 
1999). These main schools of thought differ greatly on 
their emphasis on the Islamic sources of knowledge and 
their interpretation.  It is the interpretation and 
analysis of Islamic doctrine that forms the basis for 
differing Islamic legal systems and likewise political 
governance.   
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi was the first legal 
theorist in Islam.  He attempted to balance reason and 
tradition through a form of prioritization of the differing 
Islamic knowledge sources or doctrine.  All Islamic schools 
of thought accept the systematic prioritization of Islamic 
sources of knowledge to different degrees.  The sources of 
knowledge include the Quran, the hadith or traditions of 
the Prophet, analogical reasoning or ra’y, and lastly, a 
binding consensus qiyas.  Abd al-Wahhab’s Hanbali school 
depends considerably on this particular methodology, 
utilizing analogical reasoning as a “last resort.”   
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The four schools of thought differ in interpretation 
and analysis of Islamic jurisprudence.  The Hanafi gives 
more weight to jurists’ analogical reasoning rather than 
the hadith as a source of law.  Therefore, some might say 
that it appears more flexible in decision making.  Maliki 
is also critical of tradition/hadith; it bases its 
decisions upon a form of North African/Spanish (Western) 
consensual tradition.   A fifth Shiite school of thought is 
named Jafari after the sixth Shiite Imam or priest Jafar 
al-Sadiq (699-765), and it adheres greatly to the Hanbali 
school of law, with the inclusion of the twelve Shiite imam 
traditions along with the Islamic Prophet Mohammad’s 
traditions (Esposito, 1999).  The Shafii, Hanbali, and 
Jafari schools are criticized for utilizing traditions or 
hadith to the extent that rational analysis or content 
criticism is largely absent.  The schools that utilize the 
Islamic traditions more than rational analysis are called 
ahl al-hadith or family of those who adhere to the hadith 
or traditionalists, and rationalists are referred to as ahl 
ar ra’y.  The Hanbali School, more so than any of the other 
existing schools, uses analogical reasoning as the final 
source of Islamic knowledge.   
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[insert table 6 here] 
Islamic scholars, including the founder of Wahhabism, 
Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, focused on and adhered to one 
of these schools rather than several at the same time. The 
schools were the basis of the political system’s 
institutionalization of ideology with each explicating 
specific government, educational, distributive, and legal 
systems.  
In early Islam, the masjids developed as schools or 
colleges for the jurisconsults like Hanbali (Makdisi, 
1979).  The Mosque served as an educational social 
institution whereby Wahhabi ideology was propagated 
(Leiser, 1981).  During the early stages of Wahhabism, 
these institutions also served as social reproduction 
institutions as they remain today. 
Early Islamic scholars gained respect, an audience, and 
their followers according to their ability to recite the 
Quran and/or traditions of the Prophet Mohammed as well as 
their application of them in everyday life.  The religious 
scholar of the holy city of Medinah, Sheikh Abdullah bin 
Ibrahim al Saif, asked the young Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab to recite traditions-the second holiest source in 
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Islam (Hidaayah, n.d.).  The traditions that they studied 
were most often those associated with their particular 
school of thought.  The Islamic scholar was awarded high 
positions of honor and respect.  Abd al-Wahhab rapidly rose 
to be one of the few respected Islamic scholars in the 
Arabian Peninsula.  Yet, unique to Mohammed ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, was the fact that he not only served the al-Sa’ud 
as an Islamic scholar, but as a political consultant and 
advisor. 
Contemporary Saudi Arabia is not exclusively based on 
the Hanbali jurisprudence system.  In 1970, Saudi Arabia 
set up a ministry of justice and the Shariah judicial 
system was reorganized along a more Western model in 1974 
(Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms: 
Saudi Arabia, 2005).  Ibn Sa’ud’s attempts to codify 
Islamic law were unsuccessful, so six books written by 
Hanbali jurists were chosen for reliance in Shariah courts.  
They are in order of priority-Sharaf al-Din Musa al-Hujawi, 
K. Al-Iqna; Abu Mansur al-Bahuti, Kashshaf al-Qina an al-
Iqna; Taqi al-Din al-Futuhi, Ibn al-Najjar, Muntaha al-
Iradar; Al-Bahuti, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradar; Muwaffaq al-
Din;  and Qudama al-Maqdisi, K. al-Mughni, Shams al-Din Abu 
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Muhammad b. Qudama al-Mugni li-Muwaffaq al-Din (Layish, 
1987). 
When those six Hanbali sources do not provide 
provision, several qadhi(s) or judges are allowed to 
utilize collective discretion, sometimes resorting to other 
schools.  In agrarian regime matters, local custom has 
become binding legislation in Shariah courts (Layish, 
1987).  In the Hijaz in 1926, the laws, mainly Ottoman, 
were adopted, and in 1932 following the Kingdom’s 
unification, all legislation in force in the Hijaz was 
extended throughout Saudi Arabia.  This adoption of Ottoman 
legislation was based on the need to ensure legal 
continuity and, in the absence of religious legal 
literature, adequate provisions.  Today, the commercial 
court (Mahkama al-Tijariya) and the Chamber of Complaints 
(Diwan al-Mazalim) operate with extensive powers 
concurrently with Shariah, even superseding it in some 
cases.  Yet, Shariah criminal law still applies with the 
severe punishments that it prescribes.  Today, there is a 
tendency to replace prescribed Islamic punishments with 
discretionary ones (ta’zir)-what Layish attributes to the 
Wahhabi, not Ibn Taimiyah doctrine.  This increases the 
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ruler’s power based on force and fear out of utilitarian 
considerations. 
From its inception in the late 18th century, al-Sa’ud 
rule has remained dependent on a notion of a “divine 
contract based on shariah or Islamic law” beginning with 
the alliance between Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab and the al-
Sa’ud (Kechichian, 1986). Under the guidance of Abd al-
Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Sa’ud turned the capital of Arabia, Ad 
Diriyah, into a center for Islamic study (Saudi Arabia: 
Wahhabi Theology, n.d.).  This reinforced the notion that 
Islamic study could elevate one’s social status. Next, they 
sent missionaries to preach Islam throughout the Peninsula, 
the gulf, Mesopotamia, and Syria (Saudi Arabia, n.d.). By 
1803, the al-Sa’ud managed to expand their dominion from 
Makkah to the small gulf country of Bahrain, conveniently 
positioning educational and authoritative institutions such 
as schools with teachers and state power apparatus. By 
1818, when the Ottoman destroyed the al-Sa’ud stronghold 
and Wahhabi political authority, Islam remained so 
ensconced in southern Nejd and Jabal Shammar that it would 
rise again to serve as the unifying ideology when the al-
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Sa’ud returned to their seat of power in the next century 
(The Sa’ud Family and Wahhabi Islam, 1500-1818, 1992). 
Islam, in the Wahhabi tradition, was, and remains, the 
unifying factor which allowed Abd al-Aziz to consolidate 
regions under his reign.  He used Wahhabi ideology to link 
tribes from vast and far-reaching regions of Arabia into 
one unified force.  Abd al Aziz’s rule over Arabia expanded 
from the inception of the unique alliance in the late 18th 
century to the early 19th century under his son Sa’ud, when 
the Ottoman Sultan asked his Viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad 
Ali, to liberate Makkah and reinstate Ottoman rule (Rentz, 
1972). Ibrahim Pasha liberated Makkah from Sa’ud’s 
successor, his son Abd Allah, ending a federation of 
regions.  However, Wahhabism had really gained a foothold 
in the region where previous tribal loyalties had been to a 
degree replaced by a larger loyalty, one which guaranteed 
the ultimate: equality for all, regardless of economic 
status. 
Wahhabi ideology remained strong in Arabia and Saudi 
rule was reinstated in 1843 by Turki bin Abd Allah, a 
cousin of the great Sa’ud.  However, this transition 
remained one of the most important features of Wahhabism as 
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a political system. At this point in the history of 
Wahhabism, the prior institutionalization of one ruling 
authority became one of multiple authorities, based on 
Wahhabi ideology. Al-Sa’ud ruling territories had grown so 
large that many of the regions had appointed governors and 
judges to the towns and villages to represent al-Dariyya 
and to implement Wahhabi Islamic principles.  Turki ibn Abd 
Allah used the loyalty of the governors to reunite Arabia.  
He informed the governors that the ability to reunite was 
based on Islam (in reality Wahhabi Islam) rather than the 
use of pure force. Therefore, Wahhabi Islam became an 
institutional mechanism, just as Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
and the al-Sa’ud predicated it previously, to enforce 
social control, replacing the single Islamic ruler with a 
type of rule by proxy. 
 
Early Islam → Small local population → (Makkah) One 
ruler → Direct rule 
Greater Islam → Large areas conquer/convert → Multiple 
ruling authorities → Rule by proxy 
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The idea of the potential to establish and maintain a 
political system based on rule by proxy is one which made 
Wahhabism one of the strongest and viable Islamic political 
systems in the world. Aided by the location and religious 
representation of Makkah and the necessity of every Moslem 
to pray and worship toward Makkah, although he or she may 
live thousands of miles away, the rule by proxy was even 
more successful. Wahhabism had taken root in a complex 
matrix of tribal and religious practices to form a 
comprehensive political system, ready to be put into 
action. 
[insert table 7 here] 
 
In 1912, there was a revival of Wahhabism which led to 
the formation of a religious settlement at Artawiyah, a 
village about 300 miles north of the capital city of 
Riyadh, but this time it was under the auspices of the 
Islamic brotherhood, also known as the Ikhwan (Habib, 
1997). This small town expanded quickly to a population of 
over 10,000 former Bedouins, who suddenly began devoting 
their lives to farming and learning the Quran. The Ikhwan 
enforced Islamic forms of worship through physical 
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beatings.  They also enforced closing shops at prayer times 
and governed personal appearance, including forbidding long 
moustaches.  
Four years later, another significant development 
occurred in the evolution of Wahhabism as a political 
movement. In 1916, Ibn Sa’ud designated himself ‘King’ 
along with his former title of Imam (Kechichian, 1986). 
This was the first time that the al-Sa’ud actually 
combined, in terminology, the head of state’s political and 
religious titles. This transformation could have occurred 
because Ibn Sa’ud signed a treaty with Britain that 
recognized him as the sole ruler or King of the Nejd and al 
Hasa regions the same year (Al-Farsy, 1999). Ibn Sa’ud was 
secure enough in his Wahhabi orientation that he was able 
to acquire a secular title without opposition. The 
solidification of the Islamic community’s acknowledgement 
of the Wahhabi combination of a secular oriented head of 
state with the religious institutional apparatus was 
recognized publicly. 
Another turn of events took place in 1924.  
Approximately 3000 Ikhwan stormed, looted, and set Taif on 
fire, also killing 300 townsfolk. They smashed all of the 
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mirrors that they could find.  After this, Ibn Sa’ud 
prohibited such killing and looting; by 1926, most of 
Arabia fell to the al-Sa’ud, including Makkah, Jeddah, and 
Medinah.  In 1926, an Ikhwan attack against an Egyptian 
Hajji and his loud brass band forced Ibn Sa’ud to rid the 
cities of the Ikhwan and keep them in the desert.  Ibn 
Sa’ud then fought the Ikhwan with cars and demolished most 
of their stronghold in the Kingdom by 1929 (Nkrumah, 2004). 
Key to Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings was his philosophy, 
some assert, to convert political loyalty into a religious 
obligation.  In Islamic doctrine, the separation of church 
and state as is recognized in the West does not exist.   
Political loyalty is a religious obligation as was pointed 
out at the beginning of this chapter.   
Abd al-Wahhab called for the unquestionable allegiance 
to the ruler as long as the authority directs his community 
in accordance with Islamic law (Doumato, 1992).  This 
bolstered the ability of Wahhabism to reproduce itself as a 
political system because it prevented issues of succession 
to interfere or weaken legitimization of the Wahhabi 
authority. In Islamic sources of knowledge, it is not fixed 
that a ruler is beyond question.  Yet, with the opposition 
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that existed during Abd al-Wahhab’s time to any political 
attempts to unify and settle the tribes under one ruler, 
perhaps it was the only way to attain that goal.   After 
Abd al-Wahhab died, the al-Sa’ud used force to conquer and 
re-conquer the Peninsula; however, once that was 
accomplished, they tended to practice a more accommodating 
policy.  This, perhaps stemming from Bedouin tribal 
traditions, has been a key aspect of the legitimisation and 
maintenance of al-Sa’ud rule, since the founding of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  Whatever its origins, there 
continues to be the belief in the necessity of an 
unquestionable loyalty to the Islamic leader as long as he 
retains the traditional-Wahhabi ideology and continues the 
proliferation of Wahhabi institutions locally and abroad.  
Today, whatever legitimization remains, may not be 
directed toward the sanctified rulers but rather in 
response to the false enemies or bete noir that the al-
Sa’ud have created in order to maintain their fragile 
legitimacy. The al-Sa’ud are now cautiously secularizing 
the same Wahhabi institutions they formed during their 
ascent to power in an effort to maintain legitimacy or 
power over the populations. Chapter five will address 
 67
Wahhabism in its contemporary form as it exists in the 
Kingdom’s extremely fragile and problematic society today. 
But first, this study will examine the relationship between 
the al-Sa’ud and Wahhabism, mainly how those strong 
foundations and political institutions were established, 
and finally, how the Wahhabi political institutions are 
being dismantled by the same family that erected them in 
the first place. 
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Table 4. 
Foundations of Wahhabi Based Class System 
Wahhabism Non-Wahhabi 
Study of Wahhabi 
interpretation of Islam 
according to Quran and 
Hanbali hadith and teachings 
of al-Wahhab. 
Lack of religious study or 
study of multiple religious 
texts other than Quran and 
hadith according to multiple 
schools of jurisprudence 
Elevated social class-the 
holy ones 
Lower class-the infidels 
Invited into upper class 
society power circles 
No affiliation with trading 




Differentiation between Wahhabi and non-Wahhabi 
according to Wahhabi Ideological Belief System 
WAHHABISM NON-WAHHABI OR INFIDEL 
Study of Wahhabi 
interpretation of Islam 
according to the Quran, 
Hanbali hadith, and the 
teachings of al-Wahhab. 
Lack of religious study or 
study of multiple religious 
texts and opinions other than 
Quran and hadith emanating 
from multiple schools of 
jurisprudence 
Elevated social class Lower class 
Total rejection of earthly 
pleasures as represented in 
pictures and statues (Ibn 
Taimiyah) 
Allow for representations of 
earth, i.e. pictures, statues
Utilization of the 99 names 
of God in everyday life 
including assigning first 
names (Ibn Taimiyah) 
Naming utilizing other than 




Different Schools of Islam and Key Components of the 
Belief Systems  
 
Hanbali Shafa’i Hanafi Maliki 





Iraqi Abu Hanifa 
(699-767) 




or traditions of 
the Prophet 3- 
analogical 
reasoning or 


























Final School Second to last 
school 





 Wahhabism as an Ideology and a Political System 
 
WAHHABISM 
Ideology Political System 
Belief in Muslim vs. Infidel. 
This belief separates all forms 
of Islam from the Wahhabi 
version of Islam 
Mosque operates as socio-political 
educational and legal institution. 
Wahhabi rules, regulations, and 
legislation are enforced by the 
community with the leading Islamic 
figures serving as the political 
authorities 
Belief in Heaven vs. Earth and 
struggle to separate oneself 
from earthly representations of 
all kinds. (This belief is often 
tested with sacrifice of 
material and human needs 
demonstrating member’s adherence 
to the community) 
Central Distribution System whereby 
Islamic Taxation and Charity 
provide for the Wahhabi community. 
The taxation and charity comes from 
a network of corporate, individual, 
governmental and non-governmental 
organizations to promulgate 
Wahhabism at a global level. Funds 
are transferred electronically and 
via messengers and distributed 
among the community of believers 
Belief in the utilization of 
Godly Names/Holiness in everyday 
life 
A set of institutions or mosques 
that recognize Makkah as the 
territorial symbol of removal of 
earthly pleasures and the heavenly 
realm. Makkah represents a virtual 
territory as the house of supreme 
Islamic religious authority-Allah 
Belief that authority only rests 
in God and a Muslim’s belief in 
God. 
Multiple Leaders by Proxy. One 
legitimate leader represented in 
Allah or God. Proxies rule by the 
word of God or Allah as written in 









As noted in previous chapters, Wahhabi ideology, the 
basis of Wahhabism as a political system, along with its 
unique set of political institutions including rule by 
proxy, the mosque as a social reproduction institution, and 
an Islamic distributive system, comprise one of the world’s 
most unique, potent and viable political systems.  This 
chapter examines the politicization of Islam through 
Wahhabi ideology in Saudi Arabia with an emphasis on state, 
economy, and society or the transition from Wahhabism as an 
ideology to a political system. The Al-Sa’ud’s Wahhabi 
Islamic contract was one based on the emergence of a need 
for social institutions which would assist in uniting the 
tribes of Arabia into a unified population capable of 
supporting itself from within and fighting off the external 
enemies of the time. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is known as the spiritual 
leader of the Islamic world. Its territory is documented as 
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the birthplace of a man known throughout Islamic texts as 
the ‘seal of the prophets,’ Mohammed ibn Abd Allah, born in 
570 A.D. (Metz, 1993). Saudi Arabia is also home to, as 
well as the guardian of, the sacred mosques at Makkah and 
Madinah, two of the holiest sites in Islam. Islamic law 
requires all able Moslems to make one pilgrimage during 
their lifetime to Makkah to fulfil their Islamic religious 
requirements. 
Is Saudi Arabia an Islamic community behind the guise 
of a “state (dawla)” or is it a state whose authority is 
based on the Islamic religion?  This chapter presents a 
condensed history and development of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia in order to achieve a better understanding of the 
ruling al-Sa’ud family’s politicization of a Wahhabi 
version of Islam to promulgate and sustain its absolute 
authority, power, and rule over, not only the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, but, the Islamic world. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been based on Wahhabism 
as its political system, or the notion of a “divine 
contract based on shariah (Islamic law),” from its 
inception. This contract was implemented upon the alliance 
formed between tribal adviser Abd al-Wahhab and the 
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contract’s founder, Abd al-Aziz– who further consolidated 
the alliance by marriage to Wahhab’s daughter (Kechichian, 
1986). Islam was the unifying factor or catalyst that 
allowed Abd al-Aziz to consolidate regions under his reign. 
 Utilizing Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideology, Abd 
al-Aziz linked the Arabian tribes into a unified force. Abd 
al Aziz’s kingdom grew from the beginning of the unique 
alliance with Wahhab in the late 18th century, through the 
early 19th century where it continued expansion under his 
son, Sa’ud and his successor Abd Allah (Rentz, 1972). The 
Ottoman Sultan temporarily halted the Saudi rule of a 
federation of regions in 1818 AD by securing the assistance 
of his Viceroy of Egypt, Mohammed Ali.  Ali sent Ibrahim 
Pasha to free Makkah from the al-Sa’ud and reinstate 
Ottoman rule, liberating Makkah from Abd Allah (Rentz). As 
noted earlier, this was the critical stage of transition 
between direct authoritarian rule and rule by proxy so 
evident in Wahhabism today. 
However, Wahhabi initiated rule by proxy endured and 
Saudi rule was restored in 1824 by Turki bin Abd Allah, the 
nephew of Abd al-Aziz, cousin of Sa’ud. Previously al-Sa’ud 
ruled territories had grown so large that many of the 
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regions had appointed governors and judges to the towns and 
villages to represent the incumbent ruling tribe, al-
Diriyah, and to implement Wahhabi principles and practices. 
Turki ibn Abd Allah used the governors’ loyalty to al-Sa’ud 
to reunite Arabia. He advised the governors that the 
ability to reunite was based on Islam rather than the use 
of pure force. Serious oppression of subjects was 
punishable with exile (Rentz, 1972).  
Turki’s actions are a key element to understanding the 
successful maintenance of the al-Sa’ud Wahhabi style 
legitimacy and rule. Turki advanced that legitimacy by 
emphasizing tribal values along with Wahhabi ideology, 
creating a powerful and effective authoritative 
combination. An advanced system of loyalty, honor, respect, 
and obedience is embedded in tribal members from birth and 
that very system is utilized to ensure the tribe’s survival 
– as among the Bedouin where their personal loyalty lies 
with their own kin (Rosenfeld, 1965). A tribal man cannot 
regain his lost honor in the community, so it was mandatory 
that the tribal people be treated with honor and respect to 
sustain tribal loyalty and obedience to the al-Sa’ud.   
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Al-Wahhab used the concept of alienation to promote 
Wahhabism in the Peninsula years prior because he 
understood that the alienation of a single tribe member for 
any reason could result in alienation of the entire tribe. 
The loss of one member of a tribe could affect the loyalty 
of the entire tribe (possibly an entire territory) and, 
consequently, exponentially reduce the al-Sa’ud’s revenue. 
 The shift from a tribal system to a Wahhabi Islamic 
system was facilitated by the fact that both systems 
guaranteed the leader’s honor and legitimacy based on his 
position or class.  Abd al-Wahhab is noted to say that 
there should be unquestionable allegiance to the ruler as 
long as he directs his community in accordance with Islamic 
law (Doumato, 1992).  According to Islamic sources of 
knowledge, rulers are not absolutely beyond question.  Yet, 
with the opposition that existed in the late 18th century to 
attempts to unify and settle the tribes under one ruler, 
perhaps it was the only way to attain unification. 
From the beginning of their rule, the al-Sa’ud and 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab initiated an economic system 
whereby governors and judges served as collectors of the 
tax (Dallal, 1993). The alms paid their salaries, even 
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though their duties went far beyond the tax collector. 
Turki, like his predecessors, utilized the Wahhabi system 
of combining rule with religion, to justify levying taxes, 
as an instrument of state power to consolidate the people 
under their rule and to maintain control over the region’s 
large socio-economic distributive mechanism by using the 
Wahhabi-al-Sa’ud system of equating al-Sa’ud’s rule with 
submission to Islam. 
According to Islam, Zakat is annual, obligatory alms to 
be used for very specific purposes (Quran: 2:261). The 
Quran states that Zakat is to be used for "the poor, the 
needy, those who collect them, those whose hearts are to be 
reconciled, to free the captives and the debtors, for the 
cause of God, and for travelers; a duty imposed by God. God 
is All-Knowing, All-Wise" (Quran, 9:60). In addition to the 
hajj or pilgrimage, Zakat is the third of the five pillars 
of the Islamic faith. 
The Arabian tribes accepted the relationship between 
the leader, now coined King and the Ulema or religious 
authority, similar to the relationship, which existed 
between Abd al-Wahhab and Abd al Aziz in the late 18th 
century.  Abd al Aziz had once held the esteemed title of 
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Imam; therefore, there were few, if any, who questioned his 
faith, and subsequently, his right to right to rule an 
Islamic community.  To question an Imam is almost 
equivalent to questioning the religion itself or blasphemy.   
Next, in 1925, Ibn Sa’ud expropriated the rights of the 
tribes to their own territory or diras (Al-Rasheed, 1996).  
Land redistribution did not begin again until 1964.  
Everyone can apply for a piece of land; however, 
distribution is limited and carefully controlled.  Access 
to land meant being a part of the al Sa’ud patronage 
network. 
Abd al-Wahhab required adherence to the principle that 
the ruler should be unquestionable as long as he ruled 
according to Islam, in his case the Wahhabi understanding 
of Islam.  Therefore, as long as the Wahhabi based ulema 
were with Abd al Aziz, there could be no question regarding 
his right to rule.  The ulema assisted Abd al Aziz by 
siding with him against the ‘extremist Ikhwan’ who were 
often an embarrassment with their random raids, which 
created problems among their neighbors.  A unique 
relationship between the founder of the modern day Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and the accepted religious authorities or 
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ulema commenced.  This relationship made demands on the 
public, including tax collection, easier to achieve. 
Zakat or payment of the tax need not be forced; only a 
strict belief in Islam needs to be maintained in order for 
the people to feel the need to pay taxes and likewise to 
feel guilty if they do not. It became mandatory that the 
populations equate the Saudi ruling regime with the cause 
of God to sustain al-Sa’ud’s legitimacy, not only to rule 
but to collect the taxes that financed their purpose. The 
al-Sa’ud used the Islamic tax-zakat to support a wide-
ranging campaign of conquest.  
This was the beginning of the al-Sa’ud socio-economic 
distribution center and the commencement of the largest 
religious propaganda system in the world. As long as there 
remain non-Islamic peoples and places to conquer, the Zakat 
funds will continue to fall into the hands of those who 
maintain control over Islam’s holy sites. With Zakat being 
a foundation of Islam and the propagation of Islam resting 
partly on the collection and distribution of Zakat for 
“those whose hearts are to be reconciled,” then the Wahhabi 
based distribution center will continue to function (Dhimmi 
Watch, 2005).  
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Turki was assassinated in 1834 AD to be succeeded by 
his son Faisal bin Turki who ruled until he was captured by 
Mohammed Ali and jailed in Cairo (Philby, 1955). Faisal 
escaped in 1843 and returned to the Nejd, restoring the 
symbols of the al-Sa’ud rule at the holy sites of Makkah 
and Madinah.  Triumph was short-lived and the reign of the 
al-Sa’ud descended into turmoil culminating in the family 
being driven into exile in Kuwait, by the rival al-Rashid 
family who were then in alliance with the Ottomans.  
Early in the 20th century, Faisal’s grandson Abd al-
Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al-Sa’ud re-established 
al-Sa’ud’s position as ruler by recapturing Riyadh from the 
Rashidis. The victory was made significant by Ibn Sa’ud’s 
deployment of, reportedly, only twenty men and achieved by 
the assassination of the Rashidi governor of the city 
(Mortimer, 1982). 
Initially, Ibn Sa’ud held the title of Imam or 
religious leader; however, in 1921 he changed his ruling 
title to the secular title, Sultan (Mortimer, 1982).  Next, 
he recaptured the Islamic holy shrine cities of Makkah and 
Madinah and in 1932, consolidated the Hijaz and Nejd 
regions, after which he called himself King.  King Abd Aziz 
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then named the regions under his reign the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. It remains the only country in the world named 
after a ruling family.   
During this period, jurists began to acknowledge that 
the Islamic Caliphate or religious leader of the community 
had emerged into a dynastic monarchy (Lewis, 1974). This 
could be because it was apparent that the Islamic community 
was actually a combination of secular and religious aspects 
of governance. Also, British influence was strong in the 
region and their power mechanism was the royal ruling 
family. Wahhabism was a component of Arabian society and 
the al Sa’ud was the uncontested ruling authority. 
Acceptance of the close relationship between King Abd 
Aziz and the Islamic religious body, the Ulema, grew. The 
Ulema also supported King Abd Aziz by siding with him 
against the extremist nomadic elements of the Ikhwan– the 
Muslim Brotherhood opposing secular tendencies of Islamic 
nations and devoted to strict Hanbali Islamic rites, 
combining military, agricultural and missionary functions 
(Kechichian, 1986).  The Ikhwan were creating problems among 
neighboring regions by carrying out random raids.  King Abd 
Aziz, in an attempt to resolve the problem, established two 
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hundred new settlements to be inhabited by the Ikhwan to 
influence their assimilation of a sedentary society 
(Glossary: Saudi Arabia. (n.d.). 
The Wahhabi predicated relationship between the founder 
of the modern day Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the accepted 
Wahhabi based religious authorities grew. The Ulema were 
exchanging or bartering their authority and legitimacy for 
the Kingdom’s religious power, which the al-Sa’ud was happy 
to concede as long as its own legitimacy went unquestioned. 
Al-Sa’ud’s main interest in Islam emerged as tax or Zakat 
collectors besides utilizing it for legitimacy purposes.  
The al-Sa’ud had successfully enforced rule by royal 
succession. King Abd Aziz died in 1953 and his son Sa’ud 
succeeded to the throne. He was a spendthrift, playboy and 
ineffective ruler. In 1964, the al-Sa’ud family, with the 
consent of the religious leaders and the Ulema, deposed 
Sa’ud and made one of his six other brothers, Crown Prince 
Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz al Sa’ud, King (Mackey, 2005). A 
second brother, Khalid, served as Crown Prince. Uunlike his 
predecessors, King Faisal was a practicing and devout 
Moslem, interested in modernizing the Kingdom and educating 
the masses, while maintaining an Islamic base.  
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His nephew, the son of his brother Khalid, assassinated 
King Faisal in 1975 (Metz et al, 1993). However, the Saudi 
population now had a vision and hope that a leader, such as 
King Faisal, could ascend to the throne again. Great 
numbers of Saudis named their children after King Faisal, 
known for ruling with piety, justice and strength. 
Hospitals, charity organizations, welfare associations and 
academic institutions were named after the late King 
Faisal. 
King Faisal proposed the creation of a consultative 
council in 1964 as a means of giving more voice to the 
people in line with Islamic tradition. The council was not 
realized until August of 1993, almost thirty years later 
under the rule of the late King Fahd (Saudi Arabia 
Constitution, 1993). 
Following the death of Faisal, his brother Khalid 
became King, and Fahd, his younger brother, was appointed 
his Crown Prince. During Khalid’s rule, al-Sa’ud suffered 
its first criticism of Western cultural influence on the 
royal family due to its leaning toward a more secular state 
policy in regards to Western, in particular, U.S. interests 
in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism as a political system demands 
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for strict adherence to Wahhabi ideology, an aspect of 
which calls for the complete separation of those who 
believe and those who do not as demonstrated in previous 
chapters. 
Due, in large part, to the al Sa’ud alliance with non-
Wahhabi Islamic elements and their Commodification of 
Islam, an attempt was made to take over the Grand Mosque at 
Makkah, within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by Saudi 
nationals in 1979. The rebels were later captured and 
beheaded, throughout the Kingdom over a period of weeks, to 
serve as an example to others (Kechichian, 1986). The al-
Sa’ud had begun the tightrope walk between the Wahhabi 
political system that they were instrumental in forming and 
a political system, which would allow for rationalization 
instead of traditionalism to play a greater role in their 
authoritarian rule. 
The rebellion sent a signal to the rest of Saudi 
Arabia. It was not that the royal family had ceased to 
practice Islam nor that the West had too much influence in 
the Kingdom. The attack was perceived as directed against 
the legitimacy of what had now become the al-Sa’ud 
political machine – an institution that was seen to dispose 
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of any obstacle in its path. The dichotomy of al-Sa’ud’s 
rule was thus exposed.  Their power could not be used 
against the rebels in an attack at the two of holiest sites 
in Islam.  Such an act of aggression would be a violation 
of those sites and judged as blasphemous by the Islamic 
world.  
The al-Sa’ud and the Ulema consolidated their efforts 
on issues affecting security (Bligh, 1985). The majority of 
the Ulema viewed the Makkah uprising as a threat to unity 
and as an attack on their credibility. 
King Khalid died in 1982, less than five years after 
the uprising, leaving Fahd to address the fortification of 
the house of al-Sa’ud (Layish, 1987). Fahd made enormous 
fiscal investment in neighboring countries and to 
dissenters of Western culture and other foreign supporters, 
to foster outside support, while granting the Saudi Arabian 
religious authorities, the police force, and localized 
religious leaders’ extensive license within the Kingdom 
(Saudi Arabia Invests USD one billion in Algeria, 2004) 
(Saudi Arabia invests $150 million in Sudan’s Merwe Dam 
Project, 2003). The extension of the al-Sa’ud power was not 
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limited to the streets, shops, schools and mosques. The 
authorities seized the power to enter the private domain. 
The mutawaeen (members of the Committee for the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice) and their 
bands of followers began searching the streets for any 
dissenters from Islam, chasing and beating people without 
apparent reason. They enforced strict adherence to the 
closure of shops and businesses during prayer times, the 
complete veiling of women – a practise that is not dictated 
in Islam – and all other elements of the conservative 
Wahhabi code. Local Saudi police and the National Guard 
gave free reign to the mutawaeen. Saudi police were also 
given extra authority and an unofficial curfew throughout 
the 1980s was enforced. Police patrolled the streets in 
search of anyone afoot after 10:00 p.m. with the authority 
to stop and question the individual’s purpose for being in 
that neighbourhood. The police would also interrogate 
others to confirm the validity of people’s statements.  
The local Imam was considered the Islamic prayer leader 
within the small community where his Mosque was situated 
and the al-Sa’ud began recruiting them to report on the 
community’s activities and keep track of their 
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congregation. Imams were given specific details on members 
of the congregation within their local area of 
responsibility, which varied in size from approximately 20 
to100 families. The head of the household, together with 
his sons, was expected to attend the daily Maghrib or 
sunset prayers and especially the Friday prayers. If a man 
did not attend prayer services, he was reported.  
Imam’s walked the neighborhoods taking different routes 
to prayer every day, to stop and talk to the men in the 
street. A car missing from its normal parking space at 
night would prompt the local Imam to question that man or 
his neighbors, on his whereabouts and the justification for 
missing prayers at the neighbourhood mosque (Knighthawk, 
2002). 
Realizing the potential power of the Imams, the al-
Sa’ud stationed spies at meetings that brought together 
groups of women or men to discuss Islam and at prayer 
services in the mosques, to listen to the Imam’s sermons. 
In most cases, the spies were typically comprised of single 
mothers, widows or men unable to support their families. 
The government informants are paid for by Zakat and heavy 
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oil revenues to spy on Saudi nationals and report on their 
activities (Isikoff, 2004). 
The informants report any Imam, religious leader, or 
scholar who announces a translation of the Quran or hadith, 
that conflicts with the al-Sa’ud interpretation of Islam. 
The individual is, at times, forced to issue a public 
apology for misunderstanding and misrepresenting Islam or 
he or she can be banned from speaking or attending public 
meetings. This telltale practise became so prevalent in the 
late 1980s that followers saw some of their most respected 
Islamic leaders apologizing for their own lack of Islamic 
knowledge. Not only did these actions bring public 
embarrassment to the reputable religious leaders but also 
greatly decreased al-Sa’ud’s ability to contain dissent 
within the Kingdom (Ulemas and Sheikhs Consider the 
Withdrawal of Sheikh al-Fahd and Sheikh al-Khudair a New 
Blow to Those Who Try to Disturb the Security and Stability 
in the Kingdom, 2003).  
In fact, the recently deceased King Fahd changed his 
name from the secular title of King to the sacred 
classification of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in 
November, 1986 in an effort to stave off rumors that the 
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royal family was no longer leading the Islamic community 
according to Islam (Sabertooth, 2003).  The al-Sa’ud became 
more dependent on support from outside the Kingdom and 
subsequently strengthened its alliance with the West, while 
openly creating an external enemy of the Western-allied 
Israelis – using their conflict with the Islamic 
Palestinians – to divert the now dangerous tensions 
building within its society. As long as the al-Sa’ud could 
maintain this enemy of Islam, they could maintain the 
façade that they indeed continued to adhere to Wahhabi 
Islamic ideology. 
However, the deterioration of relations between the 
religious authorities and the al-Sa’ud paralleled the 
increasingly overburdened economic situation, although the 
state of the economy was not a cause but a contributor to 
weakening relations. Inequalities present in the population 
grew wider as subsidies decreased between 1985 and 1992, 
despite ample oil revenues and the population’s ability to 
pay taxes. In 1994, King Fahd announced a budget cut of 
approximately 19% and some reports estimate a Saudi 
government deficit of $10.7 billion in 1994 (Prados, 1996). 
Decreased oil revenues, an exploding population and the 
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Gulf war were said to have cost the Saudi government around 
$55 billion, aside from the almost $17 billion provided to 
the U.S. to defer the Gulf War costs (Prados).  
The al-Sa’ud economic system’s inequalities brought 
into question the adherence of the al-Sa’ud to the long-
standing Wahhabi-al-Sa’ud Islamic distributive system. Al-
Sa’ud economic corruption ate away at the political 
system’s economic institutions established to reward the 
Islamic community for its loyalty. Over the past decade, 
the al-Sa’ud have invested, overwhelmingly, in the 
‘Commodification of Islam’ (S. Baroni, Public Presentation, 
Jan 2006). Billions of dollars flow through the, 
predominantly al-Sa’ud established, funded, and controlled 
‘Islamic’ television, film, radio, publications, clothing, 
banking, educational, and food industries. Whether or not 
this ‘Commodification of Islam’ has been done for 
individual interests or the interests of the Islamic 
community as a whole is a question that the al-Sa’ud is 
being forced to respond to today. 
To counter the al-Sa’ud power apparatus of National 
Guard, police, mutawaeen, and Imams, the populations have 
developed a highly intricate subversive social system. To 
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be discovered participating in this underground social 
network is punishable by torture, life imprisonment or 
death. However, the underground system struggles to 
revitalize Wahhabi ideological foundations and to reform 
what remains of the al-Sa’ud/Wahhabi political 
institutions.  
In March 1992, Saudi Arabia adopted a constitution by 
Royal decree of King Fahd, rather than by the Islamic 
notion of democratic consensus. Chapter 1 General 
Principles Article 1 of the constitution states that “The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state 
with Islam as its religion: God’s Book and the Sunnah of 
His Prophet are its constitution.”  This clause notes the 
that the al-Sa’ud remains committed to the principles of 
Wahhabi/Hanbali Islam and it also protects them against any 
possible threat against their rule. By affirming the Arab 
aspect of Islam, the al-Sa’ud request its neighbors to 
uphold and support its political foundations through their 
acceptance of the al-Sa’ud claim that the Kingdom is the 
center of both the Arab and Islamic world. 
According to the Quran and hadith, or the Prophet’s 
traditions on succession, nothing grants any such process, 
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as stated in Chapter 2 Article 5 (a) of the new 
constitution, that “the system of government in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia is that of a monarchy” and (b) providing 
succession to be “by the sons of the founding King Abd Al-
Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al Faysal Al Sa’ud and to their 
children’s children” (Saudi Arabia Constitution, 1993).  In 
Islam, as in the first Caliphate of the Islamic community, 
a leader is elected by consensus and pledged loyalty of the 
populations. The leader is authorized to rule as long as he 
remains in accordance with Islam and is responsible to all.  
The al-Sa’ud established a quasi-separation between 
political mechanisms and Wahabbi ideology by removing the 
religious imams and ulema from Islamic accountability, as 
none of the early Islamic caliphs (often referred to as the 
Rightly Guided Caliphs) were popularly elected. The first 
caliph-Abu Bakr, was recognized on the basis of his age and 
closeness to the Prophet; the second was designated by the 
first; the third was chosen by a counsel; and the fourth 
had the caliphate handed over to him.  
According to the 1992 Saudi constitution, the King 
appoints all deputies of the prime minister and ministers 
and members of the Council of Ministers by Royal decree 
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(Article 57) and he also has the right to dissolve and 
reorganize the Council of Ministers, presenting further 
conflict between the al-Sa’ud and Wahhabi tradition. 
According to Islam, the King must listen to his advisors 
and take their views into consideration, signifying 
consensus. The King and his ministers, who are all royal 
family members, do not allow for differences in opinion. 
Should an individual disagree with the ruling family, he is 
asked to step down, or is imprisoned, tortured or killed.  
The abuse of human rights by the ruling al-Sa’ud 
increased throughout the 1990s as the separation between 
al-Sa’ud and the Wahhabi Ulema widened (Report: Saudi 
Arabia, 2005). Al- Sa’ud restrictions placed on the Ulema 
resulted in the emergence of more dissenters within their 
ranks and the general population (On the Line, 2004). Many 
of the Ulema and al-Sa’ud family relationship fractures 
emerged after King Fahd expelled Muslims from Saudi Arabia 
during and following the Gulf War. This act was one that 
may have led to the irreversible downfall of the royal 
family. According to Wahhabi Islam, the ‘other’ or the 
infidels should never enter the holy land.  Expelling the 
Muslims from Saudi Arabia and allowing the U.S. to build a 
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base in the Kingdom, were against all principles of the 
Wahhabi ideology that the al-Sa’ud authority had depended 
on for more than a century for its own legitimacy. 
Hastening to quiet the masses in October 1994, King 
Fahd announced the establishment of the Supreme Council of 
Islamic Affairs to be led by the Minister of Defence Sultan 
ibn Abd Al Aziz and another Council for Islamic Call and 
Guidance to be led by the Minister of Islamic Affairs 
(Kostiner, 1997). The public soon realized the rules and 
regulations and appointment of members of the councils was 
not by consensus but rather by enforcement and that the 
Consultative Council was not the mechanism aimed to 
distribute power, as suggested by the King and his deputies 
from its inception. The al-Sa’ud’s perception of their loss 
of the control brought about by the Islamic contract 
initiated by their forebears is demonstrated by their 
establishment of these other political institutions under 
the name of Islam. 
Journalist Bob Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, and the 
ensuing media crisis indicates that the al-Sa’ud is 
unlikely to receive support, on which they now depend, from 
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the Bush administration in the event of continuing attacks 
against the regime (Woodward, 2004).  
The April 2004 bombing of the General Security 
headquarters in Riyadh was the third terrorist attack in 
less than one year. Daily attacks and armed struggles are 
occurring between internal Saudi security forces and 
civilian groups and individuals fighting against the al-
Sa’ud regime. Some claim that it is al-Qaeda and others 
that it is Iran. Yet, al-Qaeda is the Saudi opposition 
group based on Wahhabi Islam. The al-Sa’ud rejection of the 
Wahhabi system that its authority rested on is no longer 
accepted. The Wahhabi driven religious establishment can no 
longer act as al-Sa’ud’s mediator because they too have 
become the Wahhabi “other”-the same “other” created by the 
al-Sa’ud-Wahhabi ideology in the late 18th century to 
consolidate and unify the tribes.  
Many of the neighbourhood mosques now serve as centers 
for popular dissent and meeting grounds for those planning 
the next attacks aimed at toppling the ruling family. The 
separation of Wahhabi education in normal schools versus 
mosques-run madrusahs has historical roots. In early 
Islamic periods, Hanbalis preferred to teach in mosques 
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away from the eyes of the ruling authority controlled 
schools or madrusahs (Leiser, 1981). Therefore, Today’s 
government controlled madrusahs or schools are over-crowded 
and hosted in dirty, collapsing apartment buildings. The 
unchallengeable state curriculum is religion, which is 
studied four subjects at a time, and all forms of 
creativity are labelled blasphemous and prohibited.  
Unemployment is rising rapidly in the Kingdom and has 
reached 25% in most areas (Saudi Arabia, 2006). Government 
health services are lacking and water is scarce, with 
supply often cut off for days at a time. Monitoring and 
censoring media has become increasingly difficult for the 
government. Citizens specialize in breaking government 
computer firewalls, diverting the non-dissident religious 
authorities and deceiving or bribing the police. Al-Sa’ud’s 
creation of an external enemy to bolster its Wahhabi 
legitimacy has backfired; in the resulting rampant hatred 
of not only America but of anything that symbolizes America 
or Western culture.  
Civil disorder and dissidence within Saudi Arabia 
demonstrates that the population has little tolerance for 
its government, which they believe has turned against its 
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own Wahhabi foundations. The al-Sa’ud have broken their 
Wahhabi Islamic contract and their rule of the Kingdom is 
now in jeopardy. The Wahhabi political system they created 
to consolidate the masses under their control now seek to 
overthrow them and return the Wahhabi political 
institutions including education, economic, and legal 
systems to the people. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: WAHHABISM AND ISLAMIC 
FUNDAMENTALISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
After examination of the development of Wahhabi 
ideology into Wahhabi political systems and the 
contemporary al-Sa’ud attempts to separate the same 
founding Wahhabi ideology from its institutions, this study 
will examine Wahhabism as it compares to other Islamic 
political movements. While, fundamentalism also known as 
Islamism, emerged with the birth of Islam, Wahhabi 
ideology, dating back to the late 18th century, can be said 
to have influenced the emergence of several contemporary 
Islamic political movements. From 1970-1995, approximately 
175 Islamic fundamentalist groups existed throughout the 
Arab world (Dekmejian, 223-247). All of the groups identify 
themselves as being based on Islam; yet, Nazih Ayubi noted 
“Islam means different things to different people...to some 
it may mean legitimizing the status quo while for others it 
may provide…a spearhead for revolution.” (Karawan, 1992). 
The following pages will examine and compare three Islamic 
political movements to Wahhabism including the Society of 
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the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Jama’at-I Islami or Islamic 
Party, and today’s contemporary al-Qaeda. 
Islamic political movements, however, often did not 
share or found themselves on the Wahhabi version of Islam, 
but rather on the Islamic school of jurisprudence practiced 
in the particular country from where they initially 
emerged. While neither the Egyptian Brotherhood nor the 
Jama’at-I Islami provided, like Wahhabism, the ideological 
foundation for a religio-political fundamentalist state, 
they are still worth examining. 
Islamic fundamentalist movements such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood Society in Egypt established by Hasan a-Bana in 
1929, were founded, and in part thrived on an increasing 
intolerance of foreign influence (Brown, 144). As noted in 
earlier chapters, Wahhabism too was influenced by an 
intolerance of foreign practices i.e. the Shiite worship of 
stones or tree worship and animistic belief systems. 
Secondly, like Wahhabism, the Egyptian Muslim 
brotherhood called for the institutionalization of pure 
Islamic law. So, the insistence on Islamic legal systems 
and intolerance of foreign elements were predominant 
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factors in both Wahhabism and the Egyptian Brotherhood 
movements.  
Thirdly, like Wahhabism, the Brotherhood called for a 
strict adherence to the Islamic texts-the Quran and the 
hadith or traditions of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. The 
group, similar to Wahhabism was well organized with 
charismatic leadership (Gourley). Despite the organization 
and great appeal that the revivalist movement had, the 
group began attacking the Egyptian government. The 
assassination of President Sadat by the group only led to 
it being impossible for the group to entrench itself 
further into Egyptian political institutions.  The drastic 
measures taken by the Egyptian Brotherhood to advance their 
agenda may have resulted in alienating themselves from some 
of the public that had supported them in the first place.   
Two observations of comparison must be further 
examined.  The Egyptian Brotherhood did not become a 
political system with the necessary institutions that exert 
social control over the populations.  It did not proclaim 
to practice the Hanbali/Wahhabi version of Islam and it 
never achieved an advanced economic distribution or 
education system. It was successful in pushing Egypt’s 
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President Anwar Sadat to agree to the institution of 
Islamic law in 1980 as the main source of state 
legislation. However, Sadat was assassinated in 1981 when 
he attempted to take control of the mosques, the main 
religious educational institutions, because the Brotherhood 
had managed to swing many toward its political ideology, 
threatening the Egyptian government’s survival. The 
Egyptian Brotherhood never managed to co-opt the state to 
legitimize its activities by allowing its agenda to be 
integrated into further political institutions. This could 
be partly attributed to the fact that the Egyptian 
government did not base its authority on religious 
premises. 
South Asia’s Jamaat al Islam, founded in 1941 by Sayyid 
Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, also began as an Islamic fundamentalist 
ideology aimed at eradicating foreign influences on Islamic 
practices in South Asia (Gourley). The Jama’at was formed 
as a political movement aimed to bring society back into 
the realm of strict Islamic ideology.  
Mawdudi attempted to cut all political and social ties 
to all non-Muslims, while at the same time taking up arms 
against them. This appears similar to Wahhabism; however, 
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one must not forget that Wahhabism, although promulgating 
adherence to a strict Wahhabi form of Islam, was founded 
based on collaboration with the legitimate authority, not 
in opposition to it. Over two decades and following several 
attempts to overthrow the state apparatus, the Jamaat al 
Islam also failed.  
Yet, both the Egyptian Brotherhood and Jammat al Islam 
did not possess the founding components of Wahhabism as a 
political system. Wahhabism represented a Muslim ruling 
authority, which utilized Wahhabi Islam to derive 
legitimization from and control the masses. This was 
accomplished by integrating Wahhabi Islamic practices into 
the educational, legal, and authoritative institutions. 
Neither the Egyptian Brotherhood nor Jama’at-I Islami 
demonstrated the Wahhabi ideology which so harshly 
separates infidel from Muslim based on practice, loyalty 
and adherence to the Wahhabi version of Islam. The Egyptian 
Brotherhood was also a nationalist movement, which could 
have accounted for some of the diffusion of its potency. 
However, it was well respected in the Arab Muslim world as 
being the ultimate Islamic political force.  
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The Al-Qaeda political movement began at around the 
time of the Gulf War. Actually, it was in its 
organizational phase prior to the Gulf War, but it was 
still comprised of many smaller groups or cells separated 
by region, city, village and sometimes mosque. Al-Qaeda 
then unified the various groups or cells at the time of the 
Gulf War and accomplished this feat with the assistance of 
some of the major decisions taken by the al-Sa’ud ruling 
family. The al-Sa’ud decision, resulting in the unification 
of the Islamic political movements inside Saudi Arabia, 
came in August 1990 when the Saudi government allowed the 
stationing of Americans, Europeans and other foreign non-
Islamic people inside the Kingdom (Karawan, 1992). This act 
would not have had such a violent reaction had King Fahd 
not kicked Muslims out of the Kingdom at the same time 
including large populations of Iranians and Palestinians 
who had been working in Saudi Arabia for decades.  In a 
shocking turn of events, the ruling al-Sa’ud ordered the 
leading Wahhabi Islamic cleric Abd al Aziz Bin Baz in a 
shocking television address to authorize and sanction the 
King’s actions (Bin Baz, 1990).  
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Al-Qaeda members espouse the tenets of Wahhabi Islamic 
belief. They practice alienation of all non-Muslims and 
Muslims who do not follow their religious predisposition. 
The leader of Al-Qaeda is Saudi national Osama bin Laden 
(Brennan, Pillar, 2006). Osama is renowned for his speeches 
to members of Al-Qaeda around the world. His speeches 
provide information about the Al-Qaeda movement, which he 
heads. 
Whether or not Osama is in Saudi Arabia is irrelevant, 
because Osama, without question, speaks Wahhabi rhetoric. 
Abdullah Bijan Al-Oteibi, a once time Islamic radical said 
that “In a sense, bin Laden is using Wahhabi ideology in 
this original revolutionary form against the Saudi state” 
(Zakaria, 3). Although he speaks in general terms, in 
context, he is addressing in order: 1) Saudi Arabia; 2) the 
West; 3) Other Muslim countries; 4) Other Muslim peoples.  
There is an order to his address with the first two-Saudi 
Arabia and the West, representing the dialectic. This 
resonates with Wahhabi ideology examined earlier where the 
dialectic comprised those who believe and follow Wahhabi 
ideology and those who do not. 
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Osama’s latest speech, sent to Al Jazeera television 
station on November 1, 2004, is a unique example of some 
aspects of Wahhabi ideology.  Many of the patterns 
prevalent in this speech resound throughout the Kingdom’s 
diverse rhetorical avenues today among Wahhabi adherents.   
Osama begins his speech by praising God, “Praise be to 
Allah who created the creation for his worship and 
commanded them to be just and permitted the wronged one to 
retaliate against the oppressor in kind” (Bin Laden).  This 
statement informs the audience of several points: first, 
that the most important thing in this world is God; second, 
that man is less important than God because it was God who 
created man; and third, that God created man to worship him 
as opposed to anyone or anything else. This statement 
resonates with Wahhabi undertones. Wahhabi ideology shuns 
the worship of anything or anyone on this earth and love 
and worship for only God. Bin Laden is speaking pure 
Wahhabi rhetoric. 
The statement also represents, in accordance with 
Wahhabi ideology, an attack against the United States and 
the al-Sa’ud family, because, according to Bin Laden, the 
royal family, by their association with America, and in 
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particular the Bush family, are also non-believers or 
infidels by virtue of that association. 
Next, the statement addresses the fact that God 
commanded the Muslim or believer to be “just.” These words 
symbolize the fact that Osama is most likely addressing 
Saudi Arabia.  Osama’s word of God is to the people of 
Saudi Arabia, not the world, because the world is comprised 
of foreigners and Westerners versus those who are just or 
Saudi Muslims.  It is believed that God commanded the Saudi 
Muslims (those in the Arabian Peninsula at the time of the 
Prophet Mohammad) to lead the world by setting an example 
for the rest of the world of what it means to be just. 
According to Wahhabism, the religious and just Muslims are 
elevated believers. 
Next, Osama’s statement orders that if an individual is 
oppressed, by those who are unjust or the non-believers, 
then he or she has the authority by God to retaliate. The 
sentence “permitted the wronged one to retaliate against 
the oppressor in kind” means that Osama is addressing the 
Wahhabi populations in Saudi Arabia and around the world. 
This is a call by Osama bin Laden to war and that war is in 
Saudi Arabia. There is no need for justification of 
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retaliation against the West because that is a given, and 
it is understood that life is a war against the West.  
However, Osama is justifying the war and declaring his 
sanction of a war against other Muslims or the al-Sa’ud 
family. 
As noted earlier in Wahhabism, Al-Qaeda effectively 
uses God terms on a regular basis, illustrating the 
Wahhabi-Hanbali fixation on such terminology. By 
associating the creator or God with “just” worshipers, it 
is assumed that the wronged one is the just believer and 
the oppressor is the unjust non-believer or infidel.  In 
Wahhabism it is asserted that non-believers are Western and 
that believers or Muslim are Eastern peoples.   
The examination and comparison between Al-Qaeda and 
Wahhabism demonstrate familiar ideological similarities. To 
both, the formula al-Islam din wa-dawla (Islam is the 
religion and state) takes precedence (Kramer, 4). However, 
one must also examine the political institutions and the 
similarities and/or contrasts that exist within them. 
Wahhabism had developed its own educational systems through 
mosques, and religious schools (Madrosas). Al-Qaeda has 
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also developed and maintained an extensive network of 
mosques to teach and to enforce Wahhabi beliefs. 
Wahhabism was governed by the Islamic authority in 
Saudi Arabia-the al-Sa’ud king. Yet, the increase of Saudi 
state power at the expense of public political 
participation has led to alienation of the masses from 
authority (Cudsi & Dessouki, 191). Al-Qaeda is governed by 
Osama bin Laden, an Islamic authority as well, but his 
whereabouts are not known nor are they provided to the 
general populations. However, his prevailing presence on 
television and in the media do much the same, if not more 
in terms of governance or rule by proxy. 
Also, more so than other movements, Al-Qaeda promotes 
rule by proxy in that Osama speaks about love for God 
alone. Worship for a ruler or legitimate political 
authority is not allowed in either Wahhabism or Al-Qaeda. 
The governing authority is the true Wahhabi Islamic leader, 
at present Osama Bin Laden. 
Al-Qaeda, like Wahhabism, also has a complex economic 
distributive system (Jones, 2003). Hosting technologically 
advanced financial capabilities; the movement distributes 
and receives funds from all corners of the earth. Unlike 
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Wahhabism, the Al-Qaeda economic system is much faster 
moving and much more difficult to unravel (Lederer, 2005). 
Al-Qaeda funding travels the world in nano-seconds and 
under the guise of many covers.  
Finally, the mosques and their congregations, which are 
responsible in part for the enforcement of Islamic or 
Shariah legal principles, manage many of the operations of 
Al-Qaeda, as was the case in Wahhabism. The mosques serve 
as a transportable quasi-state reproducing some of the main 
political institutions necessary including training and 
education, providing authoritarian leadership, economic 
distribution, and mechanisms for social control. The Al-
Qaeda mosque is responsible for the community and its 
congregation ascribes to its teachings. Subsequently, 
congregational members fall within the responsibility of 
that mosque and the leader of that institution-the imam. 
Members are also subject to the rules and regulations of 
the way of life proscribed by that mosque. Religious 
identity is channelled to the Al-Qaeda congregations from 
the mosque and its leaders, with the focus being on 
individual loyalties upon religious values-critical in 
 110
mobilizing members for social, moral, and political action 
(Lapidus, 25). 
Therefore, it can be said that Al-Qaeda serves as a 
transportable form of Wahhabism. Al-Qaeda, like Wahhabism 
proscribes to strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith and 
the Hadith as interpreted by the Hanbali School of 
jurisprudence. Wahhabi and Al-Qaeda ideology are identical. 
Wahhabism as a political system with all of the 
institutions for social control is also identical to Al-
Qaeda; however, because the Al-Sa’ud struggle today to 
dismantle the Wahhabi political system that had sustained 
their rule for decades, it has had to transform itself for 
survival into Al-Qaeda, a cell like structure that 
resembles a transportable political system. Saudi Arabia’s 
inability to adapt the puritan theocratic institutional 
system with the modern conditions of a state, economy and 
society may have forced Wahhabism to temporarily transform 
its own institutions.  
Today, Wahhabi territory is virtual territory. All 
Muslims from around the world pray to Makkah. During prayer 
five times a day, they are within that territory, no matter 
where their physical beings lay. Al-Qaeda members around 
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the world look to Makkah, the ultimate religious 
representative within those cells for guidance and 
authority and they in return grant that cell legitimization 
and the funds for it to survive (Al-Qaeda / Al-Qaeda (the 
Base)).  
The examination of multiple Islamic political movements 
is necessary in order to grasp the similarities and as well 
the complexities that exist. Although the Egyptian, South 
Asian and Al-Qaeda movements differ greatly from one 
another, there are a few similarities that remain including 
the separation and alienation of non-Muslims, the call for 
an Islamic revival, and the incorporation of marginalized 
groups into their congregations. However, Al-Qaeda 
demonstrates that what was once considered the Al-Sa’ud 
Wahhabi political system is now the very potent and viable 
al-Qaeda, transportable, and at times an actual virtual 
political system. Just how one can comprehend the 
complexities in understanding a transportable political 
system and/or communicating with it, is yet to be seen. The 
ability to grasp the realities of the current form of 
Wahhabism is an opportunity that leads toward a better 




CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
 The study of the evolution of Wahhabism from an 
ideology to a political system is one in which there exist 
a multitude of theoretical and conceptual definitions that 
fall within gray areas. When does an ideology evolve into a 
political system and what defines that political system? Do 
diverse ideologies evolve into political systems 
differently? It is essential to examine a political system 
from the inception of the ideology in which it espouses, 
drawing patterns and examining relationships. In order to 
comprehend the evolution of Wahhabism from an ideology to a 
political system, it is imperative that one examine first 
the components that comprise Wahhabism as an ideology and 
subsequently as a political system.  
One of the first questions that requires examination is 
why followers of Wahhabism do not recognize the meaning of 
the term. Perhaps it is because Wahhabism as an ideology 
denies member scrutiny. Yet, only through a close 
examination of Wahhabism as an ideology, can one ascertain 
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the foundations of this denial. Lack of understanding 
amongst its followers can be attributed at least in part by 
its non-existence among members.  According to Mullins 
definition that ideology “links the cognitive and 
evaluative perception of one’s social condition,” perhaps 
members’ cognitive and evaluative perceptions of their 
social condition is such that the ideology in itself cannot 
be comprehended by members within the system (Mullins, 
1972). Such a condition then demands outside study and 
examination, in particular within the transformations that 
Wahhabism presents in contemporary society. 
Wahhabism is fluid within contemporary dynamic 
political systems and rapidly changing international 
relations, but, as a political system, it continues to 
expand at a global level, giving rise to a new form of 
contemporary terrorism as demonstrated in the comparison of 
Al-Qaeda and Wahhabism. However, can we call this form of 
terrorism a political system?  
Al-Qaeda possesses authoritative leadership through 
Osama Bin Laden, along with innumerous religious 
authorities or Imams at community mosques around the world; 
its territory is virtual or the house of God symbolized by 
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Makkah; it controls a global economic distributive system; 
encompasses a complete legal system governing a member’s 
way of life; and has the ability to enforce that 
legislation. It’s authority is unquestionable and members 
form an elite community that almost resembles a tight knit 
family unit, with members numbering in the thousands.  
Careful examination of Wahhabism as an ideology has to 
take into consideration the context within which it 
emerged. In an economically stricken, tribal, segmented 
society where class is cause for survival, religious 
studies dominated the disenfranchised and the marginalized 
poor populations (Al-Ghafur, 1964).  
Along with Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab’s new Wahhabi 
ideology came the solidification of a class system based on 
religious practices. Those who ascribed to Abd al-Wahhab’s 
religious orientation belonged to his elite community of 
pure Muslims versus all others who did not-the infidel 
versus the Muslim. It did not matter if the infidel was a 
Muslim or not. What mattered was whether they demonstrated 
through practice, their belief in the tenets of Wahhabism 
(Mortimer, 62).  
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Wahhabi ideology was not extraordinary in that it 
included the basic teachings of Islam and the traditions of 
the Islamic Prophet Mohammed, but it was very different 
from other Islamic ideologies. Wahhabism emphasized 
particular Islamic practices above others and that emphasis 
was greatly responsible for the new form of Wahhabism we 
see today in Al-Qaeda. 
Wahhabi ideology was resilient, triumphant, and not 
surprisingly, outlasted numerous regime changes in the 
Arabian Desert (Esposito, 2002). The Al-Sa’ud Abd Al-Wahhab 
alliance solidified the governing institution necessary to 
create a political system. Immediately uniting the tribes, 
collecting tax revenues, and proliferating the new ideology 
in the local training centers, the mosques, so too were the 
social institutions and economic system established whose 
foundation rested on Wahhabism as an ideology.  
As Wahhabism grew and foreign lands were conquered, a 
form of rule by proxy developed whereby local authoritarian 
leaders governed their communities according to Wahhabism; 
however, the ultimate guidance came from the house of God 
or Makkah, Saudi Arabia (Mortel, 1987).  And that house of 
God at Makkah was governed by the Custodian or Guardian of 
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Islam-the Saudi King. Makkah belonged to the Muslim masses, 
no matter how remote they may be and it was Makkah that 
dictated the legal system that all Wahhabi adherents 
recognized and obeyed. 
The Al-Sa’ud was successful in positioning its 
governance as the unquestionable ruler of the Islamic 
community. Today, to question the Al-Sa’ud is tantamount to 
questioning Islam and traitors, otherwise known as 
apostates are executed (Three Saudis executed by beheading, 
2005). Recent bombings inside Saudi Arabia and attacks 
against the Al-Sa’ud and its interests came from the 
Wahhabi followers that it created. The al-Sa’ud’s 
increasingly visible Commodification of Islam as well as 
other anti-Wahhabi tendencies has incited the Kingdom’s 
religious populations against it. 
After the 1979 takeover of the grand mosque at Makkah, 
the al-Sa’ud marketed its religious position to the masses 
focusing on the Wahhabi ideology of infidel versus Muslim, 
East versus West, and in creating external enemies that 
Wahhabism could attack (Kechichian, 1986) (Kostiner, 1992).  
However, this diversion did not prevent the public from 
acknowledging that large class differences existed, 
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especially when religious men or Imams and ulema were 
imprisoned and Muslims were kicked out of the holy land in 
1990 and foreign peoples brought in to guard the holiest 
sites in Islam following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 
(Saudi Arabia Country Profile, 2002). 
These actions constituted a public demonstration by the 
al-Sa’ud against the Wahhabi ideology. That, along with the 
continuing al-Saud Commodification of Islam, have led to a 
Wahhabi revolt inside the Kingdom. The Al-Sa’ud, in an 
attempt to arrest the growing number of Wahhabis who dared 
question their governance, began modifying the Wahhabi 
institutions that it had established decades ago 
(Stalinsky, 2003)(Al-Shamery, 2006). This unraveling of 
some of the key components of Wahhabism forced those who 
adhere to the ideology’s beliefs and practices to move 
underground. Many Wahhabi adherents fled Saudi Arabia and 
established new Wahhabi communities outside the country. 
Others deep inside the Kingdom run theirs in the virtual 
world, fleeing from the watchful eyes of the authorities 
(Teitelbaum). A communiqué, issued by al-Qaeda in Saudi 
Arabia called for revenge against the al-Saud for arresting 
40 citizens for “abetting terrorist activity in the state 
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and their impact on the Jihadist Internet community” (A 
Message from al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia Concerning the Arrest 
of Forty Suspects and the al-Hesbah Network, 2006). 
The examination of other political movements reveals 
that many of the movements did not have the chance to 
establish and form political institutions. Lacking these, 
both movements nearly collapsed and were not successful in 
establishing their hold. Al-Qaeda, however, demonstrated 
striking similarities to Wahhabism. Its economic 
distributive system was one owned and run by the people; 
the authority remained within the virtual territory of the 
house of God; its social reproduction and training centers 
remained the mosques. Yet, the mosques in Al-Qaeda were 
forced to take on greater responsibilities as the Islamic 
community began functioning as a separate political system 
inside another’s territory.  How these two systems will 
interact with one another is a question that has yet to be 
answered. Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, in his first 
appearance before his consultative counsel stated that he 
will continue on to reform the Kingdom’s economic and 
political system irrespective of any objectives of takfir 
from its religious populations.   
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This study has examined Wahhabi political ideology as 
social values which exist beneath and underlie the 
relationship between those who hold power and those who are 
controlled by that power (Loewenstein, 1953). However, if 
the Wahhabi ideology was invoked by the al-Sa’ud, forming 
the basis for a relationship between the al-Sa’ud and Saudi 
Arabia’s diverse populations, can the ideology be 
dismantled beneath the political system without a collapse 
of that system and its corresponding institutions? Crown 
Prince Sultan, deputy premier and minister of defense and 
aviation made a public statement April 4, 2006, “I can 
assure you and everyone else that the ruling family is 
united in one hand and one heart” (Qusti, 2006). Yet, the 
question is not if they have one heart or two or if they 
are united, but if the ground they stand on is strong 
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